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"MILITARY. LIGHT RAILWAYS - To transportation engineers, both civil and military, one of the most interesting features of railway work during the World War was the development of the network of 60-cm. lines (" soixante ") in rear of all the main fronts in France during the days of position warfare. These little narrow-gauge lines were, of course, no novelty, since similar lines had been employed in industrial plants, on large plantations and on large construction works. Lt.-Col. W. H. Cole, in Light Railways at Home and Abroad (1899), describes a 60-cm. line built under a concession granted in 1890 to the Decauville Co. between Caen and Dives. Another 60-cm. line of lighter rail (19

1 lb. to the yd., the same as the French military track) was built about the same time between Pithiviers and Toury, France. It was worked under lease by the Decauville Company. Nor was the idea new to the student of military affairs, as at the French siege manoeuvres before Paris in 1894 some 30 m. of such line were laid under simulated field conditions upon which complete trains were drawn by double-ended engines. German military tests in 1895 had shown that it was practicable to lay 60-cm. (or 2-ft.) tracks, with rails weighing to to 19 lb. to the yd., at a rate of from 600 to 700 yd. per hour for a distance of 31 m. of continuous laying. In the campaign in Manchuria (1904-5) both belligerents had made use of light narrow-gauge lines for distribution purposes. At Port Arthur, for example, despite the fact that the main railway supply line of the Japanese army was itself of 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, equipped with medium-weight engines and light cars of small capacity (6 tons), it was found desirable to lay 60-cm. (2-ft.) track from a transfer station or siege junction to the adjacent artillery and engineer parks and thence to the siege batteries and smaller dumps near the troops. These lines of the Japanese were not suited to the use of locomotives. The sections were merely hooked together as laid. One hook was formed by a bend in an extension of the lower flange of a rail, and this engaged with a companion hook on the end of a fish plate bolted to the web of the rail of the adjoining section. At Port Arthur the sections came to the front already assembled so that no field bolts were necessary. Where transportation on mountain roads was involved, as it was in the main campaign, the rails and ties came up separately and were assembled shortly before use. At Port Arthur the light flat cars were p ushed about by soldiers, at the Sha-ho by horses.

No discussion of these special railways would be complete without some reference to the " battle of the gauges," which raged around them during and subsequent to the World War (1914-8). Many officers with railway and military experience contend that the gauge of field railways should invariably correspond to that of the main supply railway - special light locomotives, and, if necessary, light cars being used on rapidly laid, light rail lines. Others believe that where the main line is of 4 ft. 82 in. gauge a lesser gauge is desirable for distribution within the combat area, but think that 60-cm. is too narrow; some have suggested 30-in., others 36-in., and so on increasing to standard, most of them agreeing, however, that when the main line is narrow, 3 ft. 6 in. or less, no lesser gauge is necessary. Others contend for the 60-cm., and these include many who have had long experience with these diminutive systems.

It is of value to examine into the purpose for which this character of equipment was intended at the outbreak of the World War. Gen. von Bernhardi, writing in 1912, had already indicated the use the Germans intended to make of them in the following words: " Where, during the further advance of the army, the railways are commanded by hostile fortresses or ' forts d'arret,' the capture of which will probably take some time, field railways turning them must be constructed. Where the railway network is altogether insufficient to satisfy the wants of the army, or where too many difficulties are encountered in repairing the trunk lines, field railways must be laid along lines of advance from railheads. There is no occasion in these cases for being too pedantic in constructing such lines. They are not built to last for ever, and must sometimes be rapidly taken up again. At times horse power must suffice for them until time and circumstances permit the line to be constructed for steam power. Rapidity of construction is the first object. If the line to be constructed is long, we must try to begin building it at various points simultaneously. We must try to follow each corps, if possible, with one field railway line, provided material and personnel are available to build it, which of course is not the case to an unlimited extent." Gen. von Kluck, in his book The March on Paris, says: " To assist the work of supply, a light railway system up to the several corps was successfully opened for traffic on Aug. 22 (1914); that for the II. Corps to Ninove and Vollezeel; for the IV. Corps at first to Castre, later to Enghien; and for the III. Corps to Hal." These two quotations are sufficient to establish the fact that the Germans had adopted these lines as an essential part of the open warfare equipment of an army marching to attack, and not as an expedient for trench warfare. Experience at Metz, at Toul, and at the tunnel of Nauteuil in 1870, had impressed the minds of the German general staff with the need of some means for supplying the several corps of an army attacking an enemy army just beyond or pivoting on an obstacle on the main railway line. Doubtless they had, with their usual attention to detail, selected the 19-lb. rail, 60-cm. Decauville track, as the lightest which could accommodate the locomotives and cars necessary to forward a daily corps supply of ammunition and food for a serious engagement (about 600 tons for the German corps of 1914).

This character of service was rendered by the 60-cm. lines in the open warfare attacks by the American army in 1918. Rapidly extended for each corps, they served to free the roads and standard-gauge railway terminals from congestion by animal and motor transport, and thus gave a freedom of manoeuvre for the troops engaged in breaking the hold, which the enemy insisted on maintaining, on the valleys where standard-gauge lines existed or where they could be built. For example on the American front in the attack N. from Verdun-Ste. Menehould railway, two standard-gauge lines were contemplated for the supply of the army. One of these followed the Meuse river valley to Stenay and Sedan. The enemy clung desperately to this line, and it was not until the III. Corps supplied by " soixante " forced a crossing of the river at Dun-sur-Meuse that the valley was freed and the reconstruction of the standard-gauge line could proceed. The " soixante " had given the power of manoeuvre required. The second was the Aubreville-Grandpre-Mouzon line. For the attack on Verdun, the Germans had constructed a standardgauge railway line from Mouzon to Grandpre, where it connected with a French standard-gauge railway leading to Ste. Menehould. The American plan was to build a line from Aubreville to Grandpre and thence along the German roadbed to Mouzon. Work was put under way at the beginning of the advance, Sept. 26 1918, the line being constructed as far as, and to include, a terminal at Varennes under standard-gauge railway practice. From Varennes, the " soixante " reached out to the east to supply the V. Corps. and the manoeuvres of that corps and of the I. Corps on its left, supplied from Varennes and also by " soixante " from Les Islettes, freed Grandpre and opened the Aire valley for the advance of the standard-gauge railway, which from Varennes northward was constructed in accordance with light railway practice, no ballast being used, the track being supported by ties almost in juxtaposition, alternate ties extending outside of track to permit tamping and to spread the foundation. In advance of the standard-gauge track, and on the same roadbed, a " soixante " line was laid, partly of fabricated track and partly of separate rail construction, on standard ties. While this was pushed ahead of the standard line, primarily for the supply of troops, it served to speed up the construction of the standard railway by handling materials, rails, and ties in advance of standard railhead. Points of transfer from standard gauge to the " soixante " were advanced as terminals permitted and as desired, and when so advanced the " soixante " material in rear of transfer point could be taken up if needed. This was rarely done, as the line to the rear was useful.

Ever since the days of Sevastopol, students of siege warfare had insisted upon a railway for use both by the attack and defence in fortress warfare. An 18-in. gauge had been adopted for these siege railways, and 51 m. of this track were to be carried as a part of the regular authorized store of a siege train in British practice. This equipment, including wooden sleepers but excluding cars, weighed approximately 62 tons to the m.; 25 trollies on two four-wheel bogies, weighing S4 tons, were also to be taken. The siege train included 16 pieces of artillery. For similar purposes the French had adopted a Decauville pattern track of 40cm. gauge (16 in.). In the original conception of these handoperated lines of from 16-in. to 18-in. gauge, the ordinary gauge of the country was to be brought to the field arsenal (siege junction), and the break of gauge between it and the narrow-gauge lines was to be made there, though it was accepted that under certain circumstances lines of wider gauge would be pushed forward to the front, even to the first batteries, independent of the break in gauge at the field arsenal. The British Siege Artillery Drill Book in 1898 estimated the distance of the siege arsenal at 7,000 yd. from the fortress, as being out of range of the defence guns, and this distance and the width of front to be covered by a siege unit formed the basis for the estimate upon which the 5z m. of siege track per unit was arrived at. But increases in range, and particularly in accuracy and effectiveness of fortress guns, caused a new estimate to be made of the distance to the siege arsenal, and led to a realization that not only ammunition but other stores as well would need to be more widely dispersed, not for security alone but also for better service. Such changes increased unduly the length of haul and led to the adoption of a light line suitable for locomotives.

During the World War, after position warfare was entered upon and lines became more and more permanent, the daily wear and tear led to the replacement of light rail by heavier, the improvement of the roadbeds, the increase of ballast, the increase of loads, the connecting up of separate detached lines into systems, the installation of shops and other facilities pertaining to complete systems, and a tendency, as evinced by the action of the Americans, to adopt heavier rolling-stock and more powerful locomotives so as to secure greater tonnage per engine and train mile. Unquestionably at this period, had the design de novo of a railway to meet the then existing conditions arisen, most officers would have favoured a wider gauge. But when the advance began once more, the weight of a mile of track, including sleepers, came to be a vital one and the " soixante " reverted to type. Then the heavy engines and heavy cars, still very useful in bringing up materials of construction from the rear, came to be, temporarily at least, out of place on the forward lines.

In their simplest diagrammatic form the " soixante "lines ran perpendicular to the front, from stations along a standard-gauge line which roughly paralleled the front. These perpendicular lines were connected by laterals, the whole forming a series of loops, and trains were operated out on one line and back on another. The loop system permitted a density of traffic exceeding that of double track lines, and offered an alternate route if the track was broken at any point. Most of the grading was done by hand, and every effort was made to reduce earth work by following the contour of the ground even when rather sharp curves resulted. Surface location was also advantageous because it permitted a shifting of the track in repair of a break made by shell-fire. Embankments were especially to be avoided, as handmade fills in a rainy climate meant soft track and washouts.

A most difficult problem in track construction was met with in crossing badly shell-torn ground. Old craters were half-filled with water. To level off and proceed with track-laying meant certain trouble later. Here wooden ties were used to great advantage, the fabricated track, spiked down occasionally, being frequently laid on a roadbed formed by them, the ends being supported if necessary on crib work in a manner customary in the repair of washed-out track in America.

The light railway manuals of all the Allied armies specified a depth of ballast of 6 in., extending at least 6 in. beyond the ends of ties, and noted broken stone as the most suitable material. This required about 1,000 cub. yd. of stone for each mile. Of course no such amount of material could be brought up by the line itself during rapid construction, even if it had been available in rear. Whatever was available locally was used.

Speed of construction varied greatly according to conditions. On the construction of a line between Abainville and Sorcy (28.5 km. of heavy work) it was found that 1,758 man-days were required for the construction of one mile. During the progress of this piece of work, 2.69 m. of track were built in a few minutes over half a day. The entire force engaged was 2 officers and 135 men, 2 locomotives and 2 motor-trucks. The work was in rear of a quiet sector of the American front, the conditions not being very different from those of peace. On four short tracks constructed to connect American and German 60-cm. lines after the battle of St. Mihiel (total length laid in all 19 km.), 2,012 mandays of work were required per mile. French experience indicates that this latter figure is about what is to be expected under favourable conditions. British figures vary from 1,760 to 2,400 man-days per mile. These figures may be compared with 4,300 man-days of work required in the construction of a standardgauge line, following light-railway methods, between Varennes and Grandpre during the American Meuse - Argonne offensive.

French " soixante " track consisted of rails weighing from 15to 19-lb. to the yard, made up into sections, 5 metres, 2-, metres and 1 a metres long, the steel ties being riveted to the rails. When riveted sections became bent or broken, they could not be repaired in the field. For this reason the Americans adopted a fabricated section, in which the ties were fastened to the rails by bolts and clips. If a section became bent or broken, the ties could be removed, the rails bent back to line and new ties substituted. The American rail weighed 25 lb. per linear yd., and came separately in 30-ft. lengths for laying on wooden ties as well as in fabricated sections. A mile of American track (fabricated sections) weighed a little over 75 tons, while a mile of track on wooden ties weighed about 90 tons, but where the wooden ties were cut in the forward area, the actual material from the rear weighed but 43 tons. The British used 20-lb. rail, and both British and Americans favoured the track made with separate rails laid on wooden ties. Fabricated track, however, was of great value in laying temporary lines and particularly in forward areas, as a damaged section could be removed and replaced in the dark and without much noise.

The German equipment track came in 10and 19-lb. rail, but they too made much use of the separate rail, wooden tie construction. On their main arterial lines on the Verdun front a great part of the rail weighed upward of 30 lb. to the yard, a considerable amount being very heavy rail taken from standard-gauge lines which could not be operated so far forward. The Germans made wise use of the standard-gauge track and roadbed for these narrow-gauge lines. By merely moving one rail over to 60-cm. gauge, they could use the light rolling-stock and, if need came, the standard track could be promptly reestablished. This, however, proved to be a distinct advantage to their enemies when they came to reconstruct captured lines for standard-gauge operations.

Compensated Grade in %	Steam Loco.	50 H.P. Gas. Loco.	35 H.P. Gas. Loco.
High Gear Low Gear	High Gear, Low Gear
0.0	258	62.5	125	31	62.5
1.0	133	32.5	65	16	32.0
2.0	86	21.0	42	-	21
3.0	61	15.0	30	-	15
3.5	54	13.0	26	-	- The American 60-cm. motive power consisted of 10-wheeled, 2-6-2, side-tank steam locomotives, with a weight on driving wheels of 12 tons (17.5 tons total) and 6,225 lb. tractive effort; and gasoline tractors of o-4 - o type, weighing 7 tons and 4 tons rated at 50 and 35 H.P. respectively. By actual field tests, the pulling power of these engines on various grades was determined to be (in gross tons) as follows: - The steam locomotive was powerful and gave valuable service on first-class track. It derailed and turned over very easily, owing to its lack of flexibility and very high centre of gravity. The French Pechot, having low centre of gravity and pivoted truck, was able to take curves with ease. It was not so powerful (tractive effort 5,060 lb.) as the American engine, but it stayed on the track. The German eight-wheeled, o-8 - o locomotive had a total wheel base of 7 ft. 42 in., as compared with the American 5 ft. to in. drivingwheel base and total wheel base of 15 ft. 7 in. It weighed approximately the same, 18 tons, but all the weight was on the drivers. There was little overhang and the centre of gravity was low. A flexible arrangement of end drivers gave radial action on curves. While not armoured, the cabs were low and well protected. The four-wheel well-tank locomotive of the Germans had a wheel base of but 3 ft. 74 in., permitting its use on very sharp curves. The British armies used four or five types of steam locomotives. The Hunslet, 4-6-0, seemed to have given best satisfaction. The weight on drivers was 12 tons; total weight 16 tons. Of gasoline tractors the French had several types, the principal ones being the Schneider o-6 - o, and the Crochat (petrol-electric] o -4-4 - o. The Schneider, which was equipped with a 65-H.P., 4-cylinder, 4-speed engine, compared favourably in pulling power with the steam locomotives. In part, at least, the success of this tractor was due to superior workmanship on the motor and clutch, which was of the three-disc type, and the skill of the operators. The four speeds and low centre of gravity made it suitable for work of all character. The Crochat was completely armoured. The German gasoline tractors were of two types, 0-4 - o and o-6 - o. In general construction there was little difference between them, the outstanding features of both being low construction and little side overhang. Lubrication was supplied to all moving parts from local sight feed reservoirs or from a mechanical lubricator in the cab. The planetary transmission was controlled by a hand-wheel in the cab, and the operator could apply the power gradually. No effort on his part was required to hold the power at a certain stage of engagement, as is necessary with the clutch and spring action. Simple engines, low speed, heavy fly-wheels, smooth and positive application of power, were the great points in the German tractors. The American rolling-stock was heavier and of greater capacity than that of other armies. For long hauls on fine track this was of advantage, but the "soixante " was not intended to be a long haul, heavy-traffic railway. British cars were relatively light and flexible, but included more types than those of the other armies. The German equipment was the lightest of all. Their gondola was made by attaching removable sides and ends to a flat car. One end only of their tank car was provided with roller side-bearings enabling it to run on uneven track. The tank cars of other armies derailed frequently because of lack of flexibility between the trucks. The " soixante " lines were operated by a simple system of telephone dispatching, adapted from the Manual Block System. The railway was divided into several dispatching districts, each controlling from 25 to 75 km. of track. Control was exercised by telephone through operators stationed along the line at intervals of from 3 to 5 kilometres. At advanced points, where night operation alone was possible, and during extensions, temporary operators equipped with portable field telephone sets kept in touch with the permanent operator next in rear or with a special dispatcher. The general superintendent of a system was connected by telephone with all the dispatching districts, and all orders for the movement of supplies and personnel were handled through his office. He also arranged for the proper distribution of motor-power and rolling-stock among the several districts under his control in proportion to the relative traffic requirements. (G. R. S.) Pioneer Railways in the Middle East. - In the World War, the development of standard-gauge lines in the western theatre was so high that " pioneer " lines were totally unnecessary. Much work was done in creating new sidings, short loops and the like, but owing to the nearness of the sources o` supply, the quantity of labour available and other causes, all this work was rather accelerated normal work than pioneer building proper. In the eastern theatre of war, too, most of the work done in Russia was rather a speeded-up development of the normal railway system than pioneer work, except in the case of the railway between Murmansk and Ivanka (Zuanka). Work on this line, however, was carried out by the civil authorities and under peace conditions and it can hardly be called a military pioneer railway. In two theatres, however, the pioneer railways were constructed in immediate connexion with operations, and the work done in these two theatres must be considered in some detail, both as an illustration of military railway principles and as an important element in the history of the World War. Mesopotamia In no theatre of war was the maintenance of communications so precarious a matter as in Mesopotamia. The rivers during the flood season became hardly navigable, while the constant silt deposits have not only constricted the beds but even raised them above the level of the country on either side the banks. Consequently, hundreds of square miles of land are, in spite of the protective " bunds," inundated almost every year; and railway construction is hampered or made impossible. Moreover, the climate is subject to great extremes. So intense is the heat during the months of June, July and Aug. that work has to be suspended for several hours each day; while, on the other hand, the mornings and evenings during Dec. to Feb. are so cold that the output of eastern labour is restricted. Again, it was found that, owing to the peculiar nature of the soil, unballasted surface rail-track often became unworkable after rain. And apart from these difficulties, of course - difficulties peculiar to Mesopotamia - there was also the difficulty, common to all theatres, due to shortage of material and rolling-stock; and the strain thrown upon India was very great. Railway construction in Mesopotamia began in the middle of 1916. Two railways were decided upon - the one, between Basra and Nasiriya, the other between Qurna and `Amara. The BasraNasiriya line was built on the metre-gauge; the Qurna-`Amara line on the 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge. This question of gauge was a vital and controversial one. No definitive ruling was possible during the war, however; and the gauge of each railway in Mesopotamia was usually determined by some such consideration as the availability of material and rolling-stock. But the decision to convert the Qurna-`Amara line to metre-gauge had important effect. By the end of 1916 there were in the country three unconnected railway lines, totalling 234 m. of track. One, the Sheikh Sa`d-As Sinn line (24 m. of 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge line, opened in Oct. 1916) was built in order to maintain communication between the advanced base on the Tigris and the troops on the Kut front. It was dismantled in 1917 after the Turkish retreat. The Qurna-`Amara line (70 m. of 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge line, afterwards [April 1917] converted to metre-gauge line) was opened for traffic in Nov. 1916. It ran along the right bank of the Tigris and its principal object was to relieve the river transport on the difficult section of the Tigris between Qurna and `Amara. Almost all the country through which the line had to pass is liable to flooding and the track had to be carried on high banks. Many bridges were also necessary, that at the Majar Kebir spill being 200 ft. wide. The Basra-Nasiriya line (the first metre-gauge line to be opened in Mesopotamia) followed the Euphrates and was 140 m. long. The rails were so laid on the sleepers (mostly of the Indian broad-gauge type) that, by shifting one rail, the line could be converted to a standard-gauge track. Much of the land through which the line had to pass was below flood level and banks had to be constructed. In addition to these three lines, a further 126 m. of track had been authorized in 1916 - one line to link up Basra and Qurna, the other to connect `Amara and Sheikh Sa`d. The latter line (the construction of which was not proceeded with owing to the rapid advance of the British forces) would have been some 86 m. long. Work on the Basra-Qurna line was begun in Feb. 1917. The principal constructional difficulty which had to be overcome was the crossing of the new channel of the Euphrates at Gurmat `Ali. The river there is between 60 ft. and 70 ft. deep and an ordinary pile bridge was not possible. A floating bridge was brought from India and was placed in position on Dec. 26 1917. This pontoon, however, was not a great success; owing to the rise and fall of the tide the bridge could not be used more than 16 hours daily. The old channel of the Euphrates at Qurna was crossed by a pile bridge 900 ft. long. In April 1917 the Bagdad-Samarra standard-gauge line (74 m. long) - a well-ballasted track built by the Germans in 1915 - fell into British hands. The Turks, when retreating, had damaged the line - had blown up bridges and destroyed stations; but they made no attempt to demolish the track itself; and on May 6 1917 the first British train ran through from Bagdad to Samarra. In June 1918 work began on an extension of this line; and by Sept. 1 connexion between Bagdad and Tikrit was established. In Oct. work began on a further extension - from Tikrit to Shuraimiya, a distance of 30 m.; but when the line reached Baiji, 26 m. beyond Tikrit, the Armistice was signed and any further construction on the line was abandoned. The Sumaiki-Sadiya branch of this line was opened in July 1917. After the advance beyond Bagdad in July 1917, the completion of the Kut-Bagdad line (already in course of construction) became of vital importance. This line (metre-gauge) reached Hinaidi (4 m. S. of Bagdad) on July 24 1917, the average rate of progress in construction working out at about i 2 m. per day. The line was later extended to Bagdad East, though Hinaidi remained the terminal centre. It was 109 m. long, with crossing stations at 13 points, and afforded great relief to the river traffic; for while the upstream journey from Kut occupied two days, Bagdad could be reached by rail from Kut in about eight hours. In May 1917 work had been begun on a line from Bagdad to the Diala front. It was (owing to shortage of metre-gauge material) constructed on the 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge - material from the dismantled Sheikh Sa`d-As Sinn line and the abandoned Qurna-`Amara line being used. The line - as far as Baquba - was opened for traffic on July 13 1917. It was later extended to Table Mountain, 65 m. from Bagdad. (Between Baquba and Table Mountain, it should be added, was a branch line [4 m. long and opened at the end of 1917] connecting Abu Jezra and Abu Saida on the Diala river.) The whole of this line was afterwards converted to metre-gauge - or, more accurately, a new metre-gauge line was laid beside the existing track; the section Bagdad-Baquba being opened in Nov. 1917, and the section Baquba-Table Mountain, in June 1918. The line was originally carried over the Diala river at Baquba by a pile-and-trestle bridge. At the end of 1918, however, the pile bridge was replaced by a permanent structure, consisting of four spans of loo ft. and two spans of 75 ft. on well piers. Towards the end of 1918, an extension of this line to Khaniqin, on the Persian frontier, was completed; later, the line was again extended - to Quretu, 130 m. from Bagdad. In Aug. 1917 work was begun on the standard-gauge line between Bagdad and Falluja. Owing to shortage of material, however, it was not finished until the following December. One bridge-290 ft. long - had to be built over the Euphrates just outside Bagdad. After the occupation of Ramadi, at the end of Sept. 1917, it became necessary, for the support of the advancing troops, to extend the Falluja line. The original intention was to carry it to Ramadi; but it was, in practice, only extended to Dhibban, 482 m. from Bagdad, the work being completed by Feb. 1918. The Bagdad-Hilla line was opened for traffic in May 1918. This line was, originally, to have connected Bagdad with Musaiyib, branching from the existing standard-gauge line to Dhibban at a point 3 m. from Bagdad. Changes in the strategical situation, however, led to the abandonment of the proposed line to Musaiyib, one to Hilla being decided upon instead. The Bagdad-Hilla line-58 m. long - was built of 75-lb. rails on broad-gauge sleepers. In Aug. 1918 a 2 ft. 6 in.-line was opened from Hilla to Kifl, 21 m. away, for the purpose of carrying the harvest from the Hincliya agricultural district to Bagdad. As the joint result of strategical requirements and the shortage of material, it was not found possible to complete the Bagdad-Basra through line until after the close of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Of the three alternative routes for the through line, that along the Euphrates was eventually decided on; and work on the connecting link between Nasiriya and Hilla was begun in Aug. 1918. The through line is on the metre-gauge; but it will undoubtedly be converted to the standard-gauge later. It was not, as has been said, until the middle of 1916 that railway construction began in Mesopotamia. At the beginning of 1919, however, - just after the close of the campaign - the railway system in the country consisted of some 1,000 m. of track, 799 m. being main line track, and 200 m. secondary line track. Rolling stock, too, was at first extremely scarce. In July 1917, for example, only 20 standard-gauge engines and 323 standard-gauge waggons were available, together with 57 metre-gauge engines and 979 metre-gauge waggons. But by Sept. 1918 the numbers of standard-gauge engines and waggons available had increased to 38 and 562 respectively, and the numbers of metre-gauge engines and waggons to 145 and 4,158. Inland water transport was, unquestionably, the first line of communication in Mesopotamia. It is certain however that after the advance beyond Bagdad the railways played the most vital part; and the following figures - showing the total of War Department stores (D.W. tons) carried on the principal lines in Mesopotamia during the two years 1917-8 - will make clear the growth of the freight traffic service: - Basra-Nasiriya line (metre-gauge), 542,407 tons; Basra-`Amara line (metre-gauge), 699,526 tons; Kut-Bagdad line (metre-gauge), 572,696 tons; Bagdad-Baquba-Table Mountain and Qizil Robat line (metre-gauge), 403,087 tons; Bagdad-SamarraTikrit and Baiji line (standard-gauge), 388,934 tons; BagdadFalluja-Dhibban line (standard-gauge), 122,001 tons; Bagdad-Hilla line, 37,551 tons: a total of 2,766,202 tons. Sinai and Syria The first steps towards developing a military railway system in Palestine were taken in the early part of 1916. The strategical position at the time seemed to be such as to favour a British offensive; and, as a preliminary to an offensive, certain railway construction was decided on. The doubling of the existing line from Zagazig to Ismailia was essential and, in addition, several short 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge lines on the E. bank of the Suez Canal were necessar y. The Egyptian State railways undertook to carry out the work, which had to be completed by the middle of Jan. 1916. A 2 ft. 6 in.- gauge line to the Baharia oasis and a similar line to the Kharga oasis were also laid down, though not by the State railways; the necessary material being obtained by dismantling certain private lines in Egypt. In addition, since an advance into Palestine had been decided on, the construction of a line from Qantara (on the E. bank of the Suez Canal) towards Romani and El 'Arish had to be undertaken. Royal Engineer construction companies were made responsible for the actual laying of the track on this line, the preliminary formation work being carried out by Egyptian labour. A single standard-gauge line only was laid down, the question of the double line being deferred. By Aug. 1916 the line reached Romani (41 km. from Qantara); and, within a month of the British entry into El `Arish (Dec. 21 1916), it had been extended to that place, which is 1 55 km. from Qantara. By mid-March 1917 the line was at Rafa, 200 km. from the base, and by June - in which month Gen. Allenby took over command of the E.E.F. - at a point (El Belah) about 13 km. from Gaza. In July the special commission on the Palestine railways, under Brig.-Gen. Stewart, recommended that, in view of the proposed further advance into Syria, the line from Qantara to Rafa should be doubled and at the end of the month the work was begun. During the subsequent advance to Jerusalem the Turkish line from Beit Hanun to Wadi Sarar was captured, and as it was practically undamaged it was, at the end of Nov., - by which time the main line from Qantara had been extended to Beit Hanun - used for the onward conveyance of supplies. With the capture of Jerusalem (Dec. 9) the Turkish branch line from Wadi Sarar (1.05-metre gauge, like the line Beit Hanun-Wadi Sarar) came under British control and was converted to standard-gauge. Meanwhile, the work on the main line from the base at Qantara had been continued; by March 30 1918 it had been extended to a point some 8 km. N. of Ludd, and by Dec. of the same year to Haifa, 412 km. from Qantara. A branch line from Rafa to Beersheba had been completed by the end of June 1918 and the conversion of the Turkish line - Ludd to Jerusalem - from 1.05-metre gauge to 4 ft. 82-in. gauge was also completed. The latter formed part of the original Jaffa-Jerusalem line (completed in 1892); but the section, Jaffa-Ludd, was dismantled by the Turks. The construction of the standard-gauge line from Qantara to Haifa was a remarkable achievement. Most difficult country had to be traversed. From Qantara to Rafa there was nothing but desert; and, in the early days of the line's working, derailments were constantly occurring through the silting-up of the track by sand. Later on, however, this was avoided by covering the banks with brushwood and thorn; and when the line settled firmly on the sand formation no ballasting was necessary, the hard, closelypacked sand serving as ballast. From Rafa northward and towards Beersheba was a fertile plain, but even here the heavy growth of grass and corn on the tracks made large maintenance gangs necessary. Beyond Gaza marshy land was met with and it was found to be almost impossible to build banks during wet weather owing to the spongy nature of the cotton soil. Often, indeed, sand had to be transported to provide a bed for the track, and many culverts and drains were required to combat the effect of rain on the yielding soil. As Ludd was approached the country became hilly and heavy earthwork was necessary; and a sea wall had to be built for a considerable distance S. of Haifa. From Qantara to El `Arish no bridges were necessary; but from El `Arish northward wadys and streams of varying size and depth had to be crossed; and, owing to the soft nature of the soil round the wadys, scouring of the bridge foundations had to be most carefully guarded against. Trestle bridges on concrete footings were usually constructed, pile bridges being the exception; but permanent bridges were erected at El `Arish and over the Wadi Ghuzze at Gaza, and a special swing bridge, capable of being opened in about 10 minutes, was built over the Suez Canal. Water for the use of locomotives on the main line was provided by a pipe-line system - between Qantara and El `Arish - which was capable of supplying 600,000 gal. a day. On the recommendation of Gen. Stewart's committee in 1917, additional engines and pumps were installed at a cost of £376,000; and though in March 1918 the consumption from the pipe-line was not more than 400,000 gal. a day, it was capable of supplying something like twice that amount. The furthest points from Qantara at which water was drawn for locomotives were at kilometre 194 on the main line and Karm on the Beersheba branch line. Beyond kilometre 194 water was obtained from wells. Some 15 R.O.D. sections (each consisting of 267 men) and four construction companies (each of 250 men), together with native labour, were employed on the Palestine railways; the construction companies being responsible for purely constructional work, and the Railway Operating Division sections for maintenance work other than sand clearing, the sand clearing being carried out by special gangs. Traffic on the Palestine system was heaviest in 1918. In that year the total of passenger traffic increased from 325,000 in the March quarter to nearly 650,000 in the Dec. quarter; the stores carried increasing from just over 300,000 tons (D.W.) in the first quarter of the year to 400,000 tons (D.W.) in the Sept. quarter. Throughout the campaign, it should be added, the strain on the resources of the Egyptian State railways was very great. Not only did the State railways undertake much new construction work for the military authorities, but they also had to provide for a greatly increased freight and passenger traffic at a time when their rollingstock and material were greatly depleted and when even their repair shops were being utilized for the manufacture of bombs and grenades and the repair of ordnance and machine-guns. A full account, from the technical point of view, of the Syrian and Mesopotamian railways is to be found in the Railway Gazette of Sept. 21 1920. (X.) Copyright Statement These files are public domain. Bibliography Information Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Military Light Railways'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/m/military-light-railways.html. 1910. terms of use • privacy policy • rights and permissions • contact sl • about sl • link to sl To report dead links, typos, or html errors or suggestions about making these resources more useful use the convenient contact form StudyLight.org © 2001-2022 Powered by Lightspeed Technology Ads FreeProfile

Compensated

Grade in %

Steam

Loco.

50 H.P. Gas. Loco.

35 H.P. Gas. Loco.

High Gear Low Gear

High Gear, Low Gear

0.0

258

62.5

125

62.5

1.0

133

32.5

32.0

2.0

21.0

3.0

15.0

3.5

13.0

The American 60-cm. motive power consisted of 10-wheeled, 2-6-2, side-tank steam locomotives, with a weight on driving wheels of 12 tons (17.5 tons total) and 6,225 lb. tractive effort; and gasoline tractors of o-4 - o type, weighing 7 tons and 4 tons rated at 50 and 35 H.P. respectively. By actual field tests, the pulling power of these engines on various grades was determined to be (in gross tons) as follows: - The steam locomotive was powerful and gave valuable service on first-class track. It derailed and turned over very easily, owing to its lack of flexibility and very high centre of gravity. The French Pechot, having low centre of gravity and pivoted truck, was able to take curves with ease. It was not so powerful (tractive effort 5,060 lb.) as the American engine, but it stayed on the track. The German eight-wheeled, o-8 - o locomotive had a total wheel base of 7 ft. 42 in., as compared with the American 5 ft. to in. drivingwheel base and total wheel base of 15 ft. 7 in. It weighed approximately the same, 18 tons, but all the weight was on the drivers. There was little overhang and the centre of gravity was low. A flexible arrangement of end drivers gave radial action on curves. While not armoured, the cabs were low and well protected. The four-wheel well-tank locomotive of the Germans had a wheel base of but 3 ft. 74 in., permitting its use on very sharp curves. The British armies used four or five types of steam locomotives. The Hunslet, 4-6-0, seemed to have given best satisfaction. The weight on drivers was 12 tons; total weight 16 tons.

Of gasoline tractors the French had several types, the principal ones being the Schneider o-6 - o, and the Crochat (petrol-electric] o -4-4 - o. The Schneider, which was equipped with a 65-H.P., 4-cylinder, 4-speed engine, compared favourably in pulling power with the steam locomotives. In part, at least, the success of this tractor was due to superior workmanship on the motor and clutch, which was of the three-disc type, and the skill of the operators. The four speeds and low centre of gravity made it suitable for work of all character. The Crochat was completely armoured. The German gasoline tractors were of two types, 0-4 - o and o-6 - o. In general construction there was little difference between them, the outstanding features of both being low construction and little side overhang. Lubrication was supplied to all moving parts from local sight feed reservoirs or from a mechanical lubricator in the cab. The planetary transmission was controlled by a hand-wheel in the cab, and the operator could apply the power gradually. No effort on his part was required to hold the power at a certain stage of engagement, as is necessary with the clutch and spring action. Simple engines, low speed, heavy fly-wheels, smooth and positive application of power, were the great points in the German tractors.

The American rolling-stock was heavier and of greater capacity than that of other armies. For long hauls on fine track this was of advantage, but the "soixante " was not intended to be a long haul, heavy-traffic railway. British cars were relatively light and flexible, but included more types than those of the other armies. The German equipment was the lightest of all. Their gondola was made by attaching removable sides and ends to a flat car. One end only of their tank car was provided with roller side-bearings enabling it to run on uneven track. The tank cars of other armies derailed frequently because of lack of flexibility between the trucks.

The " soixante " lines were operated by a simple system of telephone dispatching, adapted from the Manual Block System. The railway was divided into several dispatching districts, each controlling from 25 to 75 km. of track. Control was exercised by telephone through operators stationed along the line at intervals of from 3 to 5 kilometres. At advanced points, where night operation alone was possible, and during extensions, temporary operators equipped with portable field telephone sets kept in touch with the permanent operator next in rear or with a special dispatcher.

The general superintendent of a system was connected by telephone with all the dispatching districts, and all orders for the movement of supplies and personnel were handled through his office. He also arranged for the proper distribution of motor-power and rolling-stock among the several districts under his control in proportion to the relative traffic requirements. (G. R. S.) Pioneer Railways in the Middle East. - In the World War, the development of standard-gauge lines in the western theatre was so high that " pioneer " lines were totally unnecessary. Much work was done in creating new sidings, short loops and the like, but owing to the nearness of the sources o` supply, the quantity of labour available and other causes, all this work was rather accelerated normal work than pioneer building proper.

In the eastern theatre of war, too, most of the work done in Russia was rather a speeded-up development of the normal railway system than pioneer work, except in the case of the railway between Murmansk and Ivanka (Zuanka). Work on this line, however, was carried out by the civil authorities and under peace conditions and it can hardly be called a military pioneer railway.

In two theatres, however, the pioneer railways were constructed in immediate connexion with operations, and the work done in these two theatres must be considered in some detail, both as an illustration of military railway principles and as an important element in the history of the World War.

Mesopotamia

In no theatre of war was the maintenance of communications so precarious a matter as in Mesopotamia. The rivers during the flood season became hardly navigable, while the constant silt deposits have not only constricted the beds but even raised them above the level of the country on either side the banks. Consequently, hundreds of square miles of land are, in spite of the protective " bunds," inundated almost every year; and railway construction is hampered or made impossible. Moreover, the climate is subject to great extremes. So intense is the heat during the months of June, July and Aug. that work has to be suspended for several hours each day; while, on the other hand, the mornings and evenings during Dec. to Feb. are so cold that the output of eastern labour is restricted. Again, it was found that, owing to the peculiar nature of the soil, unballasted surface rail-track often became unworkable after rain. And apart from these difficulties, of course - difficulties peculiar to Mesopotamia - there was also the difficulty, common to all theatres, due to shortage of material and rolling-stock; and the strain thrown upon India was very great.

Railway construction in Mesopotamia began in the middle of 1916. Two railways were decided upon - the one, between Basra and Nasiriya, the other between Qurna and `Amara. The BasraNasiriya line was built on the metre-gauge; the Qurna-`Amara line on the 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge. This question of gauge was a vital and controversial one. No definitive ruling was possible during the war, however; and the gauge of each railway in Mesopotamia was usually determined by some such consideration as the availability of material and rolling-stock. But the decision to convert the Qurna-`Amara line to metre-gauge had important effect. By the end of 1916 there were in the country three unconnected railway lines, totalling 234 m. of track. One, the Sheikh Sa`d-As Sinn line (24 m. of 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge line, opened in Oct. 1916) was built in order to maintain communication between the advanced base on the Tigris and the troops on the Kut front. It was dismantled in 1917 after the Turkish retreat. The Qurna-`Amara line (70 m. of 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge line, afterwards [April 1917] converted to metre-gauge line) was opened for traffic in Nov. 1916. It ran along the right bank of the Tigris and its principal object was to relieve the river transport on the difficult section of the Tigris between Qurna and `Amara. Almost all the country through which the line had to pass is liable to flooding and the track had to be carried on high banks. Many bridges were also necessary, that at the Majar Kebir spill being 200 ft. wide. The Basra-Nasiriya line (the first metre-gauge line to be opened in Mesopotamia) followed the Euphrates and was 140 m. long. The rails were so laid on the sleepers (mostly of the Indian broad-gauge type) that, by shifting one rail, the line could be converted to a standard-gauge track. Much of the land through which the line had to pass was below flood level and banks had to be constructed. In addition to these three lines, a further 126 m. of track had been authorized in 1916 - one line to link up Basra and Qurna, the other to connect `Amara and Sheikh Sa`d. The latter line (the construction of which was not proceeded with owing to the rapid advance of the British forces) would have been some 86 m. long. Work on the Basra-Qurna line was begun in Feb. 1917. The principal constructional difficulty which had to be overcome was the crossing of the new channel of the Euphrates at Gurmat `Ali. The river there is between 60 ft. and 70 ft. deep and an ordinary pile bridge was not possible. A floating bridge was brought from India and was placed in position on Dec. 26 1917. This pontoon, however, was not a great success; owing to the rise and fall of the tide the bridge could not be used more than 16 hours daily. The old channel of the Euphrates at Qurna was crossed by a pile bridge 900 ft. long.

In April 1917 the Bagdad-Samarra standard-gauge line (74 m. long) - a well-ballasted track built by the Germans in 1915 - fell into British hands. The Turks, when retreating, had damaged the line - had blown up bridges and destroyed stations; but they made no attempt to demolish the track itself; and on May 6 1917 the first British train ran through from Bagdad to Samarra. In June 1918 work began on an extension of this line; and by Sept. 1 connexion between Bagdad and Tikrit was established. In Oct. work began on a further extension - from Tikrit to Shuraimiya, a distance of 30 m.; but when the line reached Baiji, 26 m. beyond Tikrit, the Armistice was signed and any further construction on the line was abandoned. The Sumaiki-Sadiya branch of this line was opened in July 1917.

After the advance beyond Bagdad in July 1917, the completion of the Kut-Bagdad line (already in course of construction) became of vital importance. This line (metre-gauge) reached Hinaidi (4 m. S. of Bagdad) on July 24 1917, the average rate of progress in construction working out at about i 2 m. per day. The line was later extended to Bagdad East, though Hinaidi remained the terminal centre. It was 109 m. long, with crossing stations at 13 points, and afforded great relief to the river traffic; for while the upstream journey from Kut occupied two days, Bagdad could be reached by rail from Kut in about eight hours.

In May 1917 work had been begun on a line from Bagdad to the Diala front. It was (owing to shortage of metre-gauge material) constructed on the 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge - material from the dismantled Sheikh Sa`d-As Sinn line and the abandoned Qurna-`Amara line being used. The line - as far as Baquba - was opened for traffic on July 13 1917. It was later extended to Table Mountain, 65 m. from Bagdad. (Between Baquba and Table Mountain, it should be added, was a branch line [4 m. long and opened at the end of 1917] connecting Abu Jezra and Abu Saida on the Diala river.) The whole of this line was afterwards converted to metre-gauge - or, more accurately, a new metre-gauge line was laid beside the existing track; the section Bagdad-Baquba being opened in Nov. 1917, and the section Baquba-Table Mountain, in June 1918. The line was originally carried over the Diala river at Baquba by a pile-and-trestle bridge. At the end of 1918, however, the pile bridge was replaced by a permanent structure, consisting of four spans of loo ft. and two spans of 75 ft. on well piers. Towards the end of 1918, an extension of this line to Khaniqin, on the Persian frontier, was completed; later, the line was again extended - to Quretu, 130 m. from Bagdad.

In Aug. 1917 work was begun on the standard-gauge line between Bagdad and Falluja. Owing to shortage of material, however, it was not finished until the following December. One bridge-290 ft. long - had to be built over the Euphrates just outside Bagdad. After the occupation of Ramadi, at the end of Sept. 1917, it became necessary, for the support of the advancing troops, to extend the Falluja line. The original intention was to carry it to Ramadi; but it was, in practice, only extended to Dhibban, 482 m. from Bagdad, the work being completed by Feb. 1918.

The Bagdad-Hilla line was opened for traffic in May 1918. This line was, originally, to have connected Bagdad with Musaiyib, branching from the existing standard-gauge line to Dhibban at a point 3 m. from Bagdad. Changes in the strategical situation, however, led to the abandonment of the proposed line to Musaiyib, one to Hilla being decided upon instead. The Bagdad-Hilla line-58 m. long - was built of 75-lb. rails on broad-gauge sleepers. In Aug. 1918 a 2 ft. 6 in.-line was opened from Hilla to Kifl, 21 m. away, for the purpose of carrying the harvest from the Hincliya agricultural district to Bagdad.

As the joint result of strategical requirements and the shortage of material, it was not found possible to complete the Bagdad-Basra through line until after the close of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Of the three alternative routes for the through line, that along the Euphrates was eventually decided on; and work on the connecting link between Nasiriya and Hilla was begun in Aug. 1918. The through line is on the metre-gauge; but it will undoubtedly be converted to the standard-gauge later.

It was not, as has been said, until the middle of 1916 that railway construction began in Mesopotamia. At the beginning of 1919, however, - just after the close of the campaign - the railway system in the country consisted of some 1,000 m. of track, 799 m. being main line track, and 200 m. secondary line track. Rolling stock, too, was at first extremely scarce. In July 1917, for example, only 20 standard-gauge engines and 323 standard-gauge waggons were available, together with 57 metre-gauge engines and 979 metre-gauge waggons. But by Sept. 1918 the numbers of standard-gauge engines and waggons available had increased to 38 and 562 respectively, and the numbers of metre-gauge engines and waggons to 145 and 4,158.

Inland water transport was, unquestionably, the first line of communication in Mesopotamia. It is certain however that after the advance beyond Bagdad the railways played the most vital part; and the following figures - showing the total of War Department stores (D.W. tons) carried on the principal lines in Mesopotamia during the two years 1917-8 - will make clear the growth of the freight traffic service: - Basra-Nasiriya line (metre-gauge), 542,407 tons; Basra-`Amara line (metre-gauge), 699,526 tons; Kut-Bagdad line (metre-gauge), 572,696 tons; Bagdad-Baquba-Table Mountain and Qizil Robat line (metre-gauge), 403,087 tons; Bagdad-SamarraTikrit and Baiji line (standard-gauge), 388,934 tons; BagdadFalluja-Dhibban line (standard-gauge), 122,001 tons; Bagdad-Hilla line, 37,551 tons: a total of 2,766,202 tons.

Sinai and Syria

The first steps towards developing a military railway system in Palestine were taken in the early part of 1916. The strategical position at the time seemed to be such as to favour a British offensive; and, as a preliminary to an offensive, certain railway construction was decided on. The doubling of the existing line from Zagazig to Ismailia was essential and, in addition, several short 2 ft. 6 in.-gauge lines on the E. bank of the Suez Canal were necessar y. The Egyptian State railways undertook to carry out the work, which had to be completed by the middle of Jan. 1916. A 2 ft. 6 in.- gauge line to the Baharia oasis and a similar line to the Kharga oasis were also laid down, though not by the State railways; the necessary material being obtained by dismantling certain private lines in Egypt. In addition, since an advance into Palestine had been decided on, the construction of a line from Qantara (on the E. bank of the Suez Canal) towards Romani and El 'Arish had to be undertaken. Royal Engineer construction companies were made responsible for the actual laying of the track on this line, the preliminary formation work being carried out by Egyptian labour. A single standard-gauge line only was laid down, the question of the double line being deferred. By Aug. 1916 the line reached Romani (41 km. from Qantara); and, within a month of the British entry into El `Arish (Dec. 21 1916), it had been extended to that place, which is 1 55 km. from Qantara. By mid-March 1917 the line was at Rafa, 200 km. from the base, and by June - in which month Gen. Allenby took over command of the E.E.F. - at a point (El Belah) about 13 km. from Gaza. In July the special commission on the Palestine railways, under Brig.-Gen. Stewart, recommended that, in view of the proposed further advance into Syria, the line from Qantara to Rafa should be doubled and at the end of the month the work was begun. During the subsequent advance to Jerusalem the Turkish line from Beit Hanun to Wadi Sarar was captured, and as it was practically undamaged it was, at the end of Nov., - by which time the main line from Qantara had been extended to Beit Hanun - used for the onward conveyance of supplies. With the capture of Jerusalem (Dec. 9) the Turkish branch line from Wadi Sarar (1.05-metre gauge, like the line Beit Hanun-Wadi Sarar) came under British control and was converted to standard-gauge. Meanwhile, the work on the main line from the base at Qantara had been continued; by March 30 1918 it had been extended to a point some 8 km. N. of Ludd, and by Dec. of the same year to Haifa, 412 km. from Qantara.

A branch line from Rafa to Beersheba had been completed by the end of June 1918 and the conversion of the Turkish line - Ludd to Jerusalem - from 1.05-metre gauge to 4 ft. 82-in. gauge was also completed. The latter formed part of the original Jaffa-Jerusalem line (completed in 1892); but the section, Jaffa-Ludd, was dismantled by the Turks. The construction of the standard-gauge line from Qantara to Haifa was a remarkable achievement. Most difficult country had to be traversed. From Qantara to Rafa there was nothing but desert; and, in the early days of the line's working, derailments were constantly occurring through the silting-up of the track by sand. Later on, however, this was avoided by covering the banks with brushwood and thorn; and when the line settled firmly on the sand formation no ballasting was necessary, the hard, closelypacked sand serving as ballast. From Rafa northward and towards Beersheba was a fertile plain, but even here the heavy growth of grass and corn on the tracks made large maintenance gangs necessary. Beyond Gaza marshy land was met with and it was found to be almost impossible to build banks during wet weather owing to the spongy nature of the cotton soil. Often, indeed, sand had to be transported to provide a bed for the track, and many culverts and drains were required to combat the effect of rain on the yielding soil. As Ludd was approached the country became hilly and heavy earthwork was necessary; and a sea wall had to be built for a considerable distance S. of Haifa. From Qantara to El `Arish no bridges were necessary; but from El `Arish northward wadys and streams of varying size and depth had to be crossed; and, owing to the soft nature of the soil round the wadys, scouring of the bridge foundations had to be most carefully guarded against. Trestle bridges on concrete footings were usually constructed, pile bridges being the exception; but permanent bridges were erected at El `Arish and over the Wadi Ghuzze at Gaza, and a special swing bridge, capable of being opened in about 10 minutes, was built over the Suez Canal. Water for the use of locomotives on the main line was provided by a pipe-line system - between Qantara and El `Arish - which was capable of supplying 600,000 gal. a day. On the recommendation of Gen. Stewart's committee in 1917, additional engines and pumps were installed at a cost of £376,000; and though in March 1918 the consumption from the pipe-line was not more than 400,000 gal. a day, it was capable of supplying something like twice that amount. The furthest points from Qantara at which water was drawn for locomotives were at kilometre 194 on the main line and Karm on the Beersheba branch line. Beyond kilometre 194 water was obtained from wells.

Some 15 R.O.D. sections (each consisting of 267 men) and four construction companies (each of 250 men), together with native labour, were employed on the Palestine railways; the construction companies being responsible for purely constructional work, and the Railway Operating Division sections for maintenance work other than sand clearing, the sand clearing being carried out by special gangs. Traffic on the Palestine system was heaviest in 1918. In that year the total of passenger traffic increased from 325,000 in the March quarter to nearly 650,000 in the Dec. quarter; the stores carried increasing from just over 300,000 tons (D.W.) in the first quarter of the year to 400,000 tons (D.W.) in the Sept. quarter.

Throughout the campaign, it should be added, the strain on the resources of the Egyptian State railways was very great. Not only did the State railways undertake much new construction work for the military authorities, but they also had to provide for a greatly increased freight and passenger traffic at a time when their rollingstock and material were greatly depleted and when even their repair shops were being utilized for the manufacture of bombs and grenades and the repair of ordnance and machine-guns.

A full account, from the technical point of view, of the Syrian and Mesopotamian railways is to be found in the Railway Gazette of Sept. 21 1920. (X.)

Bibliography Information
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Military Light Railways'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/m/military-light-railways.html. 1910.

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