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Battles of the Somme

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"BATTLES OF THE. SOMME - Under this heading it is proposed to deal with the principal battles which took place in Picardy and southern Artois during the World War. The geographical. limits in which these battles took place may be roughly defined. as the Scarpe on the N., the Oise on the S., the line Cambrai - La Fere on the E., and the line Amiens - Creil on the W.

The strategic geography of this region is governed by the course of the Somme between St. Quentin and Amiens; in the upper part of this course it runs S. - N., in the lower E. - W., and in that general course it continues to the sea. Thus from Peronne, the point at which the river bends through the right angle, to Abbeville, a water barrier divides opposed armies that face N. - S., and separates each into well-defined tactical theatres if they are operating towards the E. and the W. The upper (or strictly the middle) Somme (Peronne - Ham) prolonged to the Oise by the Crozat Canal, on the other hand separates the E. - W. adversaries and either protects or hampers those operating in N. - S. direction. Thus the operations which took place in the region, profoundly influenced by the alignment of the Somme and its tributaries, are in spite of their dissimilarity, properly designated " battles of the Somme." In the first phase of the war, this region was traversed by the German I. Army, and a number of local combats took place between it and the forces that Joffre gathered, little by little, to form his VI. Army and outflank the Germans in their wheel.

More severe and continuous fighting took place between the Oise and the Scarpe during the development of the opposed northern wings in the " Race to the Sea." Of this the battles of Lassigny, Roye, and Albert, which led up to and even into, the battle of Arras (see Artois, Battles In) formed the first phase.

In each locality or area the effort of each side to hold the other frontally, while outflanking him to the N., produced an ever-extending frontal battle that, after see-sawing to and fro, produced the line of stabilization characteristic of the trench warfare period.

In 1915 the line of stabilization between the Oise and the Scarpe was relatively quiet. And apart from a combat in Jan. 1916, in which the French lost possession of Frise, the line, as it was left at the close of the " Race to the Sea " in 1914, was the starting line of the great offensive of July 11916.

I. Battles Of July-November 1916 The four months and a half of almost continuous fighting which began with the great attack of July 1 1916 mark a turningpoint in the World War in more than one respect. With July 191 began that period of sustained and systematic Allied pressure upon the enemy which, though interrupted in the spring and early summer of 1918 by the desperate German counteroffensive, in the end wore his resistance down. Before July 1916 the Allied offensives had been relatively brief interludes in a long period of stalemate; from that date onwards it was the periods when active operations were in abeyance which formed the interludes. Further it is clear even from the grudging admissions of the German commanders that this great struggle materially affected the strategical situation as no earlier Allied offensive had, that the strain which the maintenance of their defence imposed on the resources and the moral of the German armies exercised an important influence on the course of the struggle. The actual gains of ground made by the Allies between July I - Nov. 19 1916 were not large, but in making them they established a moral ascendancy over their enemy and brought home to the Germans the probability of defeat. And in this struggle the British army had for the first time to bear the major part: the French who fought on Sir Douglas Haig's right with so much gallantry and efficiency played a part of the greatest importance in the battle, but one as distinctly subordinate to the efforts of the British as the British attacks in May and Sept. 1915 had been to those of the French.

To speak, as is the common habit, of "the battle of the Somme" in 1916 is to fall into a natural but serious error. The operations were a series of great battles, each surpassing all those of previous wars in magnitude and intensity, parts of a common whole but still definite and separate operations for distinct purposes. It is possible to distinguish four main phases in the operations: first the winning of a position on the southern edge of the main plateau between the Somme and the Ancre, a matter of three weeks' hard fighting, embracing two attacks on a large scale and many lesser intermediate operations; in the second phase, which lasted till the middle of Sept., nearly two months, the operation took the shape of a contest for this main ridge and for the extension of the footing which the Allies had gained upon it so as to enable them to develop their offensive on both flanks as well as straight to their front; in the third phase the Allies pushed forward across the ridge and down its farther side, only to have their progress arrested by the persistent bad weather which set in about the beginning of Oct. and prevented anything like a general attack upon the rearward system of defences which covered Bapaume and Peronne; the fourth phase of the operations, extending from the beginning of Oct. till Nov. 18, saw a series of smaller efforts against particular points and strongholds, culminating in a bigger attack on Nov. 13 astride the Ancre which completed the reduction of the main ridge and captured ground of vital importance on the right bank of the Ancre. But the main rearward system was not penetrated, thanks largely to the mud which hampered every movement of the attackers and made the performance of the normal adminis trative services for the troops in the advanced position a task of the greatest difficulty. The devastating effects of the repeated bombardments made themselves felt over the whole area: houses and whole villages were reduced to ruins; woods were represented by a few shattered stumps and a tangle of broken trunks and branches; roads were rendered impassable till the battlefield became a dreary wilderness of mud and water-logged shell craters. To maintain trenches in defensible condition was all but impossible, to consolidate a captured position, difficult even in dry weather, became practically out of the question. The middle of Nov., therefore, saw active operations broken off and two months elapsed before anything more than quite minor operations became possible. The operations during the two months which preceded the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line, including as they did a systematic advance up both banks of the Ancre on Bapaume, were essentially the continuation and completion of those of the last phase of the operations of the autumn, and it would be not unreasonable to treat them as yet another stage of " the Somme." They had brought the British practically within striking distance of the last line which covered Bapaume and Peronne when in the middle of March the German retreat anticipated its enforced evacuation. First Phase. - The German positions astride the Somme and Ancre attacked on July 11916 were strong by nature and had been made doubly formidable by every device known to the military engineer. Their line represented the positions taken up in Oct. 1914 by the German VI. Army in the course of that " Race to the Sea " which culminated in the desperate fighting of Oct. and Nov. 1914 for Ypres and the Yser. The line then established had remained substantially unchanged, for neither side had since then attempted any operations of importance in this quarter where the British III. Army had relieved the French in front of Albert in July 1915. Hence the Germans had had ample time to develop their defences to the highest degree: villages and woods had become fortresses; two elaborate trench systems, each comprising several lines, had been dug, the second from two to three miles in rear of the first, " switches " - communication trenches - connected them up and greatly complicated the task of the attacker who should happen to penetrate any part of the front. Deep dug-outs, to the construction of which the chalk country lent itself admirably, gave shelter to the trench garrisons during bombardments; deep belts of barbed wire protected the different trenches, and most careful and skillful arrangements had been made for enfilade and supporting fire from numerous machine-guns; positions of special tactical value had been secured by formidable redoubts, while a well-placed and ample artillery was ready to support the defenders. Moreover, the advantage of the ground lay with the Germans, whose facilities for observation were excellent.

The frontage selected for the attack extended from just N. of Lihons on the extreme right to the Somme at Curlu, a distance of about nine miles, crossed the Somme and ran as before from N. and S. to Maricourt, another 3,000 yards. Here the French front ended, and the line turned sharply and ran W. for 7,000 yards. Here it turned N. again, making a sharp salient at the village of Fricourt. Thence to the Ancre, approximately io,000 yards, the line ran over several spurs which jut S.W. from the ridge which formed the backbone of the German position. This ridge runs roughly N.W. from Peronne, dividing the valley of the Somme from the basins of the Scarpe and Scheldt. After crossing the Ancre the German line continued in a generally N. direction in front of Beaumont-Hamel and Serre, this last village forming the N. end of the front to be attacked, though a couple of miles farther N. a subsidiary attack was to be made against the pronounced salient at Gommecourt. The total frontage was over 25 miles, exclusive of the Gommecourt operations.

Against this frontage the British had available the five army corps of Sir Henry Rawlinson's IV. Army, which put into the front line eleven divisions keeping another nine in reserve, while two divisions of the III. Army (Sir E. Allenby) were to be employed against Gommecourt. On the German side some six divisions were holding the line to be attacked .by the British.

Opposite the French, where they do not appear to have been expecting an attack, they were proportionately weaker, having three divisions in the line on a front of eleven miles.

Relatively to the numbers engaged in the Loos offensive, the British army was not employing in its first attack any greatly increased force of infantry. Where its preparations had altogether outstripped those of Sept. 1915 was in artillery, and it was on this arm that its chief hopes rested. For the six days' preliminary bombardment the heavy guns available were so numerous that it was difficult to find good positions for them all. Indeed the artillery personnel engaged in the first attack came to nearly half that of the infantry, and in weight as well as in number of guns the Allied artillery were able to establish a predominance over the enemy. This was largely due to the success with which the Royal Flying Corps was at the time contending against the enemy's aircraft; the mastery of the air which it had established ensured to the Allies - when weather conditions permitted - observation of artillery fire and denied to the enemy this important advantage and the opportunity of gaining information of movements behind the lines. Ammunition, too, if not as unlimited as it was to be in 1918, was plentiful. The careful economy which had been a painful necessity during the winter and spring had allowed the accumulation of large reserves, and although the great development of munition-making in England, undertaken in the summer of 1915, was only just beginning to produce its effects, its influence was already apparent in the effective bombardment to which the German positions were subjected for the week preceding the attack.

In one way the bombardment was almost too effective. The destruction was in some places so complete that it proved far more difficult to consolidate captured positions and to hold them against counter-attacks than to carry them. But to a large extent the German defences proved capable of withstanding even the tremendous shelling to which they had been subjected. Many nests of machine-guns had escaped intact, in places there were still stretches of uncut wire and the German artillery were able to make a most effective reply. North of the Ancre in particular German counter-battery work had much to do with the failure of the 31st Div. (VIII. Corps), the left of the main attack, to capture Serre. On its right the 4th Div. penetrated some way into the German position N. of Beaumont-Hamel, but found its flanks exposed by the check to the 31st Div. and by the failure of the 29th Div. against Beaumont-Hamel itself, one of the very strongest parts of the German line. It was counterattacked and driven out after a stubborn resistance.

Immediately S. of the Ancre the X. Corps fared little better than the VIII. Its left division, the 36th (Ulster) began well and pressed forward N. of Thiepval. But Thiepval itself, another formidable fortress, defied the attacks of the 49th and 32nd Divs., with the result that the very success of the 36th contributed to its undoing. Its advanced detachments were cut off and overwhelmed, and in the end it was forced to evacuate its captures. South of Thiepval, however, at the angle known as the Leipzig Salient a slender foothold was gained and maintained despite the vigour of the German counter-attacks. On the right of the X. Corps, the 8th and 34th Divs. of the III. Corps had two very difficult places to attack in the strongly fortified villages of Ovillers and La Boisselle. Neither of these was captured, but the III. Corps managed to penetrate the German lines on either side of them, very slightly N. of Ovillers, rather more deeply between that and La Boisselle, and very much deeper S. of La Boisselle. Here also the 21st Div. of the XV. Corps, flanked on its right by a brigade of the 17th Div., made substantial progress N. of Fricourt, which village was in danger of being cut off, as E. of it the 7th Div., also of the XV. Corps, was most successful, storming the German front lines and penetrating as far as the village of Mametz. To the right again the XIII. Corps (18th and 30th Divs.) made great progress, reaching all its objectives from Montauban, W. to Mametz and E. to the Briqueterie. Thus, despite the failure of the British left and the limited success of the centre, the right had made a promising opening.

The reverse on the left may be in part explained by the excep tional strength of the German defences N. of the Ancre, and by the concentration of the German artillery in that quarter where they both expected and especially feared an attack. Had Beaumont-Hamel and Thiepval gone the German position on the main ridge would have been more seriously endangered than it was by the British success between Fricourt and Montauban. But if the Germans were less well prepared for an attack on this frontage, opposite the French they were certainly neither expecting one nor ready for it; and this, together with the ample artillery support available and the superior experience of the French gunners, contributed to the complete success of General Foch's attack. On both banks of the Somme his infantry mastered the German front system and made their way deep into their positions, reaching the outskirts of Hardecourt and Curlu N. of the river, while S. of it they progressed even farther, taking Dompierre and Foy. Exploiting their victory, the French pressed on, and by July 4 not only penetrated into the second system of German defences, but captured it over a length of six miles from Estrees N. to the Somme at Buscourt. Some 6,000 prisoners fell into their hands, with many guns, and as S. of the river they were well forward of the line reached on the right bank they were able to enfilade the German positions from across the river.

While General Foch's troops were exploiting and increasing their gains the British IV. Army was similarly employed, though on a frontage shorter than that originally attacked. Recognizing the futility of renewing the attempt on the formidable positions astride the Ancre, Sir Douglas Haig decided to concentrate his efforts on pushing home the success of his right. Divisions which had lost particularly heavily, like the 8th and 36th, were withdrawn and replaced by others from the reserves. Four days of hard and continuous fighting substantially extended the lodgment gained on July 1. The 7th and 17th Divs. joined hands behind Fricourt, cutting off that village; then, supported by the 23rd, they pressed forward against Contalmaison while the 19th Div. on their left reduced La Boisselle and made headway towards Ovillers. Advancing from Montauban after repulsing several strong counter-attacks the XIII. Corps captured Caterpillar and Bernafay Woods. With this the hostile front system over a front of six miles was secured and consolidated, but before a footing could be gained on the main ridge it was necessary to cross the valley which runs N.E. from Fricourt, to gain more ground towards Contalmaison, and to reduce Ovillers.

On July 7 therefore a second stage of the first battle started, the 12th and 25th Divs. assailing Ovillers while the troops who had cleared Fricourt and La Boisselle pushed on against Contalmaison and the 38th (Welsh) Div. attacked Mametz Wood. This last proved difficult to reduce but was finally cleared by the 21st Division. By July 13 Contalmaison also had been taken, and after some desperate fighting by the 9th, 18th, and 30th Divs. important gains had been made on the British right, Trones Wood (which changed hands repeatedly) being the scene of the fiercest contests. Meanwhile the French had cleared Hardecourt and advanced their line S. of the Somme to Biaches.

During all this fighting the German resistance had been stiffening. The stubborn fights which had been put up for Ovillers and Contalmaison and Trones Wood had given time for the arrival of strong reinforcements and the reorganization of the defence. The divisions on whom had fallen the brunt of the bombardment and of the first attack had been relieved by fresher troops; artillery had been shifted to meet the requirements of the new situation. Moreover, as the Allies advanced over the area devastated by the bombardment their administrative difficulties increased at each step; the advance of the guns to new positions meant new arrangements for ammunition supply, roads had to be repaired or improvised, and the feeding and watering of the advanced troops were laborious and troublesome. All these circumstances added to the difficulties of the next step, the assault upon the enemy's second system of defences on the S. crest of the main ridge. This system, though hardly as strong as that stormed on July 1, was formidable enough, and, like it, was supported by the fortified villages Longueval, Bazentin le Grand, and Bazentin le Petit and by several woods. To get within assaulting distance the troops had to advance under cover of darkness for about i,000 to 1,400 yards in order to line up below the crest. This operation was a severe test for the troops; most of them had no experience of anything but trench warfare, but they acquitted themselves most creditably and the attack, launched just before dawn on July 14, met with great success. The 18th Div. finally cleared Trones Wood. Longueval and the two Bazentins were carried, the former by the 9th Div., the others by the 3rd and 7th Divs., while farther W. the 21st Div. cleared Bazentin le Petit Wood, and more ground was gained on that flank by the 1st and 34th Divs., though here the success was less complete.

For a time indeed even more substantial, almost decisive, results seemed within reach, for, after some counter-attacks on the British centre had been repulsed, it proved possible to push the 7th Div. forward to the top of the ridge to occupy High Wood. But the divisions on the flanks could not get up level with this, and though all the next day the detachment in High Wood held its ground, the position was untenable and had to be evacuated on the evening of July 15. The Germans, indeed, realizing the critical nature of the situation, spared no efforts to stop the further progress of the British and developed a series of counterattacks against which the captured positions were only maintained with the greatest difficulty. Thus, though the attack had given the British the Bazentin Ridge on a front of 6,000 yards, and had incidentally led to the complete isolation and surrender (July 17) of Ovillers, which allowed a substantial advance to be made toward Pozieres, it was followed by a phase of the battle in which the Allied progress was disappointingly small and seemingly out of all proportion to the efforts made and to the casualties incurred.

Second Phase

The battles of July 1-12 and July 14-17 had left the Allies in a tactical situation not altogether advantageous. The check to the British left centre had left the Germans in possession of Thiepval which with Pozieres about two miles S.E. of it presented serious obstacles to any progress towards the Ancre and threatened to enfilade any further advance straight to the front. Pozieres must be mastered before the British centre could get forward. Even more important was it to improve the position round Longueval, where the advance of July 14 had created a sharp salient with its apex at Delville Wood, N.E. of the village. From this point the British line ran almost due S. to join the French at Maltzhorn Farm S.E. of Trones Wood, being continued thence S.W. of Maurepas to the Somme at Ham. It was imperative that the British right and the French troops N. of the Somme should make a substantial advance in order to reduce the sharpness of the salient at Delville Wood, a point which was extremely difficult to maintain, being subjected to a concentric artillery fire from the N. and E. as well as repeatedly counter-attacked. The wood had been captured on July 15 by the S. African Brigade of the 9th Div., but had been promptly counter-attacked by the 10th Bavarian Div. and then by the 7th and 8th Divs., picked troops all of them, and its possession continued in dispute for weeks. Longueval in like manner changed hands several times, the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 18th Divs. in addition to the 9th being at one time and another engaged in the struggle for these key positions, the scenes of fighting as desperate as any in the long struggle of " the Somme." And when at last Delville Wood had been cleared the task of debouching from its ruins presented great difficulties. In Ginchy and Guillemont, E. and S.E. of it, the enemy had positions of great strength, the fortifications of which formed a formidable support to their second system of trenches which ran S.E. by Maurepas towards the Somme. Maurepas proved a similar stumbling-block to the French; they reached it on July 30, but not till Aug. 24 was it completely in their hands, and they had to pay heavily for it. And behind Maurepas lay Le Forest with Rancourt and Fregicourt yet farther back.

The last week of July and all Aug. passed without any advance like that of July 14. The Germans fought stubbornly and counter-attacked persistently and resolutely, while, as overaddiction to the use of the bomb had sadly reduced the standard of musketry of the British infantry, their counter-attacks escaped XXXII.-17 the punishment they would have received in 1914. It was a time of constant and desperate fighting, of small advances, of many repulses and disappointments. Guillemont in particular was attacked on July 23 and July 30, on August 8 and August 16, but without more success than the capture and retention of the railway station on the outskirts of the village. But despite all these checks the line crept forward: to a considerable extent on the French front where, during Aug., it got within assaulting distance of Combles, Le Forest and Clery, and nearly 3,000 prisoners were taken; to a smaller extent on the British right; to a rather larger extent in the British centre, where the 33rd Div. won a foothold in High Wood and the 5th and 7th gained ground between that point and Longueval, while W. of High Wood a series of minor operations gradually advanced the British line up the crest. Farther to the left again, there was hard fighting by the troops of the Reserve or V. Army. This had been formed after July i by putting Sir Hubert Gough in command of the left wing of the IV. Army, in order to allow Sir Henry Rawlinson to concentrate his attention on the attack to the E. of the Albert - Bapaume road. The capture of Pozieres was urgent as an indispensable preliminary to any advance over the watershed, and when this was accomplished (July 25) by the 1st Australian Div., flanked by the 48th, an important gain had been secured. But the German resistance in this quarter was very determined, and though some progress was made towards Thiepval from the Leipzig salient on the S. and from Pozieres, Mouquet Farm E. of Thiepval proved a stumbling-block. Bad weather, too, with much rain and frequent cloud which impeded aerial observation of artillery fire, hampered the attackers, and the Germans, now thoroughly alive to the importance of holding up this advance, brought up fresh divisions with great rapidity. By the end of August five times as many German divisions as had been in the line on July I had been located on the British front. However, by Ludendorff's own admission, the strain on the Germans was tremendous; the need for constantly relieving exhausted divisions taxed their resources in men, artillery was so short that batteries were constantly kept in the line when their relief was due, the ammunition supply was beginning to cause anxiety, and worst of all, the resistance of the German infantry was weakening under the pressure of the Allied infantry attacks and of the Allied superiority in artillery and aircraft. The supersession of General von Falkenhayn as chief of the general staff by FieldMarshall von Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as his chief assistant (" First Quartermaster-General "), which took place on Aug. 27, may be in part attributed to the effects of the Somme, and was promptly followed by " the momentous order for the cessation of the offensive at Verdun." Pressed as they were on the Somme the Germans could no longer continue attacking elsewhere. If the immediate Allied gains on the Somme seemed small their offensive there had already relieved Verdun.

With September the second phase of the struggle was reaching its final stage. This took the shape of a general attack, extending almost as far as that on July 1, even N. of the Ancre, where the V. Army once again assaulted Beaumont-Hamel. Most success fell to the French, who not only attacked and took Le Forest and Clery but attempted more S. of the Somme than on any occasion since the middle of July. Besides pressing on against the BernyVermandovillers line which they had then reached they extended their attack as far S. as Chaulnes, storming the old German front line on a front of three miles. Their success here, which brought over 7,000 prisoners with many guns, did not as immediately affect the fortunes of the main struggle as did the capture of Le Forest and Clery, which was a considerable help to the British right as well as threatening Combles and the Peronne - Bapa um e line, where the Germans were already busy on a rearward system of defences; still, it increased the area on which the Germans had to keep on the alert, and it was a great encouragement to the French, so lately strained to the utmost to retain Verdun, to be recovering more territory from the German grip.

To the British, Sept. 3 was a day of more qualified success. Once again the Beaumont-Hamel position proved impregnable, the efforts of the 49th Div. against Thiepval met with no success, and though in the British centre between High Wood and Delville Wood ground was gained, German counter-attacks recovered most of it. But the right fared better. The 10th (Light) Div., assisted by a brigade of the 26th (Irish) Div., at last mastered Guillemont, the obstacle which had held up so many attacks and cost so many casualties. The 7th Div. reached Ginchy, but after desperate fighting was thrust out of it again, while on the extreme right three days of hard fighting gave the 5th Div. Falfemont Farm and brought it to Leuze Wood. Here, therefore, the original German second system, which had so long held back the British right, was at last pierced and when on Sept. 9 this success was followed up by the capture and retention of Ginchy by the 16th Div. and the advance of the 56th (London) Div. up to Bouleaux Wood, the great stumbling-block to the advance of the British centre was at last so far removed that it could now push forward without putting itself at a grave disadvantage from enfilade and reverse fire. Thus the battles for Guillemont and Ginchy (Sept. 3 and 9) mark a very definite stage in the Allied progress. The forward crest of the main ridge was in their hands over a front of five miles and more. It was now possible to plan a general advance against the villages on the northern slopes of the watershed. Such an attack, if successful, would bring the British up against the rearmost of the enemy's original systems of defence, and would make the position of the Germans on their old front line S. of the Ancre and immediately N. of it a pronounced salient.

Third Phase

The next attack, therefore, opened a new phase in the offensive. Special preparations were made for it, and a week's pause after the taking of Ginchy allowed of many reliefs. Thus the ten divisions of the IV. Army employed in the attack of Sept. 15 included several which had not yet taken part in the operations, among them the Guards, the 6th, one of the original units of the 1914 " B.E.F." and the New Zealand. Similarly in the V. Army the Canadian Corps had replaced the Australians, who had since their capture of Pozieres made considerable gains N. of the Albert - Bapaume road. In addition to these fresh troops it had been decided to employ in this attack a new weapon from which much was expected. Despite the great increase in the available artillery and ammunition and the great improvements in the methods for directing, controlling and observing artillery fire, barbed wire and machine-guns were still the chief assets of the defence and had held up attack after attack. The evolution of the " tank " had been a long process. The idea of an armoured motor-car capable of defying both machine-guns and barbed wire had occurred to many people from the earliest days of the deadlock set up by the extension of the trench line from Switzerland to the North Sea. To translate this idea into practical shape, to produce a machine capable of accomplishing what was wanted, had been the work of months of ingenuity, experiment, devotion and skill. Not the least remarkable feature had been the success with which secrecy had been maintained. The tanks at their first venture hardly fulfilled their designers' hopes and expectations - it would have been extraordinary if they had - but they did quite well enough to encourage the Allies and to shake the moral of the German infantry, to whom they came as an effective surprise.

The frontage included in the British attack stretched from just S. of Courcelette to just W. of Combles. That strongly fortified position itself was not to be attacked, as the capture of the high ground on either side of the valley would determine its fate, and S.E. of the valley the French, who had already on Sept. 12-13 attacked and taken Bouchavesnes with 2,000 prisoners, were ready to cooperate.

The attack proved a great if not a complete success. On the left the Canadians not only captured their objectives S. of Courcelette but exploited their success so well that the village itself, not part of the original objective, was carried and consolidated. To their right the 15th (Scottish) Div. captured Martinpuich, High Wood was at last completely cleared by the 4 7th Div. and farther to the right again the New Zealand and 41st Div., with some assistance from tanks, captured Flers and pushed some way beyond it. On the right the success was less pronounced. A strong work between Ginchy and Morval known as the Quadrilateral held up the 6th Division. The tanks detailed to attack this point broke down and the gallant efforts of the infantry were unavailing. This check prevented the Guards Div. reaching their final objective, Lesboeufs, though they stormed their first and second objectives on the ridge S.W. of that village and maintained their position against counterattacks. But with Lesboeufs and Morval, the objective of the 6th Div., still in German hands, the centre of the attack could not push forward without creating the same sort of situation as had prevailed on the right after the attack of July 14, and any further exploitation of the success was out of the question. Still, a big success had been achieved, a strong position had been broken into on a six-mile front, 4,000 prisoners had been taken, and the troops had the encouragement of having crossed the ridge and being able to see what lay on the farther side of the crest it had cost so much to gain.

The days that followed had to be occupied in reducing the Quadrilateral and in straightening out the line between Martinpuich and Flers. The 6th Div., not to be denied, pressed hard upon the Quadrilateral and after another unsuccessful attempt captured it on Sept. 18. But it is significant of the intensity and costliness of this fighting that the Quadrilateral had cost the 6th Division over 3,500 casualties. Its capture, however, allowed the line to be pushed forward within r,000 yards of Morval and Lesboeufs, against which a new attack was in preparation.

Bad weather, however, delayed the delivery of this attack until Sept. 25. On this day the frontage attacked started at the Albert - Bapaume road but reached as far as the Somme. The French had, since capturing Bouchavesnes, improved their position S. of the Somme considerably by completing the reduction of Vermandovillers, Berny and Deniecourt, and they had on Sept. 20 successfully repulsed a strongly pressed counterattack, N. of the Somme. Their objectives on this occasion included Rancourt and Fregicourt, Combles being dealt with indirectly by the capture of the heights on either side of it.

The " battle of Morval " - the official title for the attack of Sept. 25 - was one of the most successful of the separate incidents of the Somme offensive. Except in the British centre at Guedecourt all the objectives were reached and carried before nightfall. On the left the 50th, 1st, New Zealand and J5th Divs. carried the line forward down the slopes N. of Flers and Martinpuich clearing two lines of trenches; on the right the Guards and 6th Divs. carried Lesboeufs and the 5th Div. took Morval, while Guedecourt also was captured next day (Sept. 26) by the 21st Div. assisted by a tank. The French were equally successful, and early on Sept. 26 British and French met in Combles, which was found full of stores and of German dead and wounded, the garrison having withdrawn just in time. Over 1,50o prisoners were captured by the British and nearly as many by the French, while signs were not wanting that the Germans were no longer putting up the stout resistance they had offered in the long struggles round Delville Wood and Guillemont. At several points large numbers of Germans surrendered or evacuated their positions almost without fighting. The strain of the continual bombardments and of the steady advance of the Allies was beginning to make itself felt.

The substantial success of Sept. 25 on the Allied right and centre was promptly followed up by victory in another quarter. Since July 1 there had been only one serious effort to renew the direct attack on the British left and the attempt of Sept. 3 had been a failure. Thiepval and all N. of it remained untaken. What progress had been made in this quarter had been from the S. and E. and it had not been rapid. The first real gain had not been made till the last half of Aug. when the scanty foothold already secured in the Leipzig salient directly S. of Thiepval had been enlarged by the 48th Div. This had been followed up by the capture (Aug. 24) by the 25th Div. of a trench known as the " Hindenburg trench." A violent counter-attack by a Prussian Guard Div. was successfully beaten off and minor gains had followed. Finally, on Sept. 14, a formidable redoubt known as the " Wonderwork," and situated just S. of Thiepval, was stormed by the i i th Division. Meanwhile the progress of the Australians beyond and W. of Pozieres had greatly increased the prospects of success in attacking Thiepval.

From Thiepval a trench ran E. towards Courcelette known as the Zollern trench, halfway along which and N. of Mouquet Farm was the Zollern redoubt. North of Thiepval was the strongly fortified Schwaben redoubt from which the Stuff trench ran E. to the Stuff redoubt S. of Grandcourt, being continued beyond the Stuff redoubt as Regina trench. The capture of this second line would allow the British to overlook the Ancre valley and would make the position of the Germans N. of the Ancre most precarious. It was natural, therefore, that the Germans should cling with great pertinacity to the Thiepval position, but despite a stubborn resistance the V. Army's attack (Sept. 26) achieved a conspicuous success. The Canadian Corps on the right carried their objectives and brought their line within striking distance of Regina trench. The 11th Div. stormed the Zollern redoubt, the 18th on the left had the satisfaction of capturing Thiepval itself with over i,000 prisoners from a Wurttemberg regiment, which had held that stronghold for nearly two years and believed it impregnable. These successes were promptly exploited and the capture of the Stuff redoubt by the lath Div. and of part of the Schwaben redoubt by the 18th (Sept. 2 7-28) left the Germans with only a scanty foothold on the main ridge.

Simultaneously with the success at Thiepval, lesser but useful gains had been made by the IV. Army, including the capture of Destremont Farm, S. of Le Sars (Sept. 2 9). This was followed up by the taking after a stubborn fight of Eaucourt l'Abbaye (Oct. 3), though a gallant effort by the Canadians against Regina trench (Oct. z) proved unsuccessful.

Fourth Phase

It was at this moment, when the enemy's fourth system of defences had been reached and the Allies seemed about to accomplish a break-through (for the new lines on which he was at work still farther to the rear were not to be compared in strength or completeness with those already overcome), that a long spell of bad weather set in. Nothing could have been more unlucky for the Allies. As has been said, the German infantry were no longer fighting with their old resolution, their counter-attacks were not pressed with the old devotion and determination. But the constant rain and the cloudy days, which formed almost the only intervals in the rain, prevented adequate observation of artillery fire and turned the already damaged battle area into an impassable quagmire. The troops already engaged in the Somme offensive had had ample experience of hardships and difficulties; those encountered in Oct. and Nov. altogether surpassed what had gone before. The state of the ground was appalling: it had become a sea of mud, through which even lightly equipped runners found movement almost impossible, much more men laden with rifle, equipment and ammunition. In these conditions an ordinary trench relief was an achievement, to attack across such ground a hopeless undertaking. It is easy now to argue that the attempt to continue the attack in such adverse circumstances was a mistake, and could achieve nothing

commensurate with the casualties and sufferings which it entailed. But it must not be forgotten that to suspend the offensive meant relaxing the pressure on the Germans, on whom the strain of fighting under these conditions was scarcely less severe and meant also giving them time to convert their incomplete new lines into defences scarcely less formidable than those the Allies had so painfully slowly pierced. At the beginning of Oct. the Germans had been pressed back to their last really strong positions, and behind the line that ran from Sailly-Saillisel past Le Transloy and in front of Bapaume they had not had time to develop anything elaborate or formidable. The anxiety of the higher command to pierce the Le Transloy line without delay was natural enough.

The situation after the capture of Thiepval was that on the British left the Germans retained a precarious footing on the heights above St. Pierre Divion and Grandcourt, but that any substantial advance by the British centre, now almost down into the Ancre valley N. of Martinpuich and Guedecourt, would turn the German positions lower down the Ancre. As before, however, the centre could not push on far with safety unless the right came forward level with it, and it was in front of the right that the German positions were most formidable. Their SaillySaillisel-Le Transloy line, itself strong, was covered by a long spur running in a N.W. direction and separating Lesboeufs and Guedecourt from Le Transloy and Beaulencourt. To capture this spur was indispensable before the Le Transloy line could be attacked. But a successful attack on the Le Transloy line was needed to open to the Allies the opportunity for an advance on a wide front in a N. and N. E. direction. Such a stroke would not merely outflank the Beaumont-Hamel position but the whole German position from Arras to the Ancre would be taken in rear. A dry Oct. might well have seen this hope realized and in Oct. 1916 there was no " Hindenburg Line " to bring an Allied advance to a standstill.

But with the weather as it was Oct. was a month of disappointment and scanty progress. The fighting was constant and costly. Trenches were difficult to take but much more difficult to consolidate or defend. The operations may be divided into three groups; on the right the French attacked and took SaillySaillisel but could make little progress N. and E. of it. In this quarter the repeated British efforts against the spur in front of Le Transloy resulted in the establishment of their line on its crest of the spur. In the centre, after the capture of Eaucourt L'Abbaye (Oct. 3) the chief gain was that the 23rd Div. secured Le Sars on Oct. 7. But to the N.E. of Le Sars the Allied progress was arrested by the gentle rise on which stands the mound known as the Butte de Warlencourt. This position was not particularly formidable in itself and in dry weather would not have held up the advance for long, but between the difficulty of accurately observing the fire of the supporting artillery and that of moving up the muddy slope on which the Butte stood attack after attack failed. The 47th Div. on Oct. 7, the 9th and 13th on Oct. 12, the 50th on Oct. 25 all found the Butte impregnable, though between Oct. 18 and 20 the 9th Div. did secure an advanced position in Snag trench, halfway up the slope, after a savage struggle.

The failure to take the Butte de Warlencourt or to make any substantial progress farther to the E. was to some degree compensated for on the left. Despite more than one repulse the line of Regina trench from the Courcelette-Pys road W. was stormed on Oct. 21 by the 15th, 18th, 39th and 4th Canadian Divs., and on Nov. 10 the Canadians extended their success by capturing the E. part of the trench on a front of half a mile.

By this time a sufficient improvement had taken place in the weather to allow of an operation on a larger scale than anything attempted since the battles of Morval and Thiepval. The more ambitious schemes for an advance across the Upper Ancre could not be put into force, but the German hold on the BeaumontHamel position had been weakened by the capture of Thiepval and it was decided to renew the attack in this quarter, the only portion of the frontage originally attacked which was still in German hands.

After a bombardment covering two days, the attack was delivered about an hour before daybreak on Nov. 13. South of the Ancre the 19th Div. cleared the German trenches N. of the Schwaben and Stuff redoubts and the 39th Div. took its farthest objective at St. Pierre Divion with remarkable ease and rapidity. North of the river the 63rd (Royal Naval) Div. fought its way forward to Beaucourt sur Ancre and held on tenaciously though in advance of the troops on its left. These, the 51st (Highland) Div., had been stoutly opposed at BeaumontHamel but had finally mastered the village, N. of which the 2nd Div. had carried the right portion of its objective. On the left, however, where the ground was specially heavy, the 3rd and 31st Divs. had been less successful; Serre had once again proved impregnable. But on the following day the success was exploited, Beaucourt was captured and the 51st and 2nd Divs. pushing forward along the spur N. and E. of Beaumont-Hamel established themselves on a line which secured Beaucourt on the N. and W. With this important gain of ground over 7,000 prisoners were taken, and to the Germans the quite unexpected loss of the long impregnable Beaumont-Hamel " was a particularly heavy blow " (Ludendorff). Advantage was taken of this victory to deliver a successful attack on a front of three miles against the German trenches on the slopes above Pys and Grandcourt (Nov. 18), but then the return of bad weather finally stopped the prosecution of active operations.

General Aspects

The Allied offensive on the Somme had not yielded all the results that had been hoped for or that had at times seemed within reach. It was only natural that in some quarters the heavy cost at which the watershed between the Somme and Ancre had been mastered should be looked upon as altogether disproportionate to the gains, and that those who had not studied war sufficiently to realize that decisive victory is not to be had without a heavy price, and that it is not in achieving but in exploiting victory that the more tangible and spectacular gains are reaped, should be so disappointed as to overlook the substantial results which had been achieved. The Allies had begun the offensive with three main objects: to relieve the pressure on Verdun, to pin the enemy's main forces down to the western front, and, lastly, to wear down his powers of resistance. All these had been achieved, and of the three, the last, if the least tangible, was far from the least important. The 40,000 prisoners taken by the British and the 30,000 taken by the French might seem trifling in comparison with the vast captures made by both sides on the eastern front, but in quality the Germans taken on the Somme were very different from the half-armed Russians and the unenthusiastic mixture of nationalities who formed the Austro-Hungarian armies; and the decline of the German moral, admitted as it is by Ludendorff, outweighed in importance their losses in prisoners or material, considerable as these latter were. An eye-witness of the battle of Malplaquet wrote of that action, " the enemy was so advantageously posted that when the battle was over we wondered how we had surmounted the difficulties." Those who had been through the Somme might well have echoed his words, and despite the punishment they had received and the hardships they had endured the British and French had ample reason to be encouraged by their achievements. If the flower of the " new armies " of Great Britain and her Dominions overseas had been expended on the Somme, the Allies ended the year 1916 with a moral ascendancy over their enemies and with well justified hopes. It is only necessary to compare the strategical situation of Dec. 1916 with that of July r to see what a change had come over the war. On July 1 the Germans were certainly not contemplating attempting to negotiate a peace through the good offices of a neutral. And where had the change been brought about? Not on the eastern front, where Rumania had collapsed and the Russian offensive come to a standstill; not in Macedonia, where the capture of Monastir had been powerless to assist Rumania; not in the more distant theatres of war, where Kut was still in Turkish hands and the British had not yet reached the eastern frontier of Egypt; not in Italy, where the AustroHungarians were still holding up the Italian offensive across the Isonzo. Bad weather had prevented the immediate exploitation of the success earned in the struggles of July, Aug. and Sept.; changes of command and of plan were to throw away much of what the Allies had in their grasp early in 1917, but the change in the situation was the work of the Allied forces on the Somme. (C. T. A.) German Offensive Of March-April 1918 As soon as the general military situation towards the end of 1917 seemed to offer the Germans a possibility of conducting the war in the western theatre by means of attack, preparations for this were set on foot by the Supreme Command. The first German move was to fetch up all the troops from elsewhere that could be spared and establish - at least temporarily, until the strong American reinforcements were added to the Allies - a balance of forces in the western theatre of war, or, if possible, a preponderance on the German side. This would obtain the necessary time for rest and training. To this end German division after division, and battery after battery, had been rolling up since the end of 1917 from Italy and the East into France. A number of heavy Austro-Hungarian batteries were also brought up. Finally 62 divisions and 1,706 batteries were made available for the main attack. For a second simultaneous attack in a different place these forces were not enough.

Systematic training for the attack was begun simultaneously behind the whole German front. Side by side with following out the instructions issued by the Supreme Command, the whole body of men had to be brought to exchange the defensive idea with which they had been living for the idea of the attack. The troops had to be taught the full use of machine-gun fire, guns and ininenwerfer, and the support which airmen could give to infantry. They had to be trained to the utmost mobility and uplifted morally. The idea of surprise, which offered the only chance of the successful execution of a break-through operation, had also to be worked out in tactics.

Hand in hand with the equipping of the division chosen for the attack with horses and utensils of every kind went the collecting of munitions, supplies, building and sanitary materials, as well as the erection of railways, roads and battery positions.

Only a limited number of divisions could be equipped for the attack owing to the shortage of draft and horses. The building preparations were extended along the whole of the W. front so as to veil tactical purposes as long as possible.

At the end of Dec. 1917 the German Supreme Command had arranged for the mounting of quite a number of attacks. Although it was admitted that, for want of forces, the whole Allied front could not be attacked at once in order to find the suitable point for a break-through according to the Schlieffen idea, it was intended to keep the enemy as long as possible in ignorance of the German Supreme Command's actual intentions.

The decision as to which attack should actually be carried out was arrived at from a tactical point of view, strategical considerations being put aside. " Tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects," writes Ludendorff, " which it is futile to pursue unless tactical success is possible. A strategical plan which ignores the tactical factor is fore-doomed to failure." Starting from this point of view Ludendorff decided to carry out the so-called " Michael " attack against the projecting southern sector of the British front. The attack was aimed at the British only, because they were still exhausted from the fighting of 1917 and it was desirable on general grounds to beat them first. It was to be executed at an early date independently of weather conditions. The sector to be attacked was thinly held and insufficiently fortified. It therefore seemed probable that the attack would succeed and that strategical use could be made of the break-through. It was unavoidable that the attack should take its course over the ground destroyed in the " Siegfried " retreat and the battle of the Somme.

The plans for the great attack were issued by the Supreme Command on Jan. 24 1918. The following individual attacks were to be prepared: - " Mars" (left wing) and " Michael I.," towards the N.E. past Bapaume, by the XVII. Army; " Michael II.," to the N. of the Omignon brook, by the II. Army; " Michael III.," on both sides of St. Quentin, by the XVIII. Army; " Archangel," south of the Oise, by the VII. Army. The " Michael " attack was proposed for March 20. The " Mars " and " Archangel " attacks were to follow a few days later, after the regrouping of the " Michael " artillery. The main attack was to break through the enemy front, and then, in conjunction with " Mars " left wing, to push on through Peronne - Arras. The XVIII. Army was to reach the line La Fere - Peronne. The "Archangel" attack was conceived merely as a diversion. The preparation of the attacks on Ypres - La Bassee (George I. and II.) was to be continued, the Hector - Achilles operations in the Argonne and Champagne were to be kept simmering. In case the Michael attack stopped short there was to be an attack by the III. Army. Instructions for demonstration actions were kept in reserve.

Rupprecht's group of armies, which, according to this plan, were to carry out the main assault with the XVII. and II.

Armies, were instructed to aim first and foremost at cutting off the British in the Cambrai bend. The armies were to advance with strong inner wings, the XVII. on Ypres and the II. on Equancourt. Subsequently the XVII. army was to deliver an assault in the direction of Arras-Albert and gradually roll up the adjacent British front, the II. Army to push forward in a westerly direction with the left wing on the Somme.

In the German Crown Prince's group of armies the XVIII. Army had to conquer the Somme and the Crozat Canal and eventually to extend to Peronne. If the II. Army should encounter any considerable resistance the XVIII. Army was to advance strong forces through Beauvois-Tertry to cut off the opponent in front of the II. Army. The Mars attack S. of the Scarpe was to follow the Michael attack as soon as possible and amplify the Michael operation. Farther N. preparations were also made to profit by it (Mars, N. Walkiirenritt).

The forces provided for the break-through were 15 attack divisions and 2 position divisions for the XVII. Army, 15 attack divisions and 3 of position for the II. Army, and 19 attack divisions and 5 of position for the XVIII. Army. Be- sides these, 3 divisions were retained by the Supreme Command for disposal, first at Bouchain, then at Denain. As regards artillery, 950 field batteries, Tor heavy and 55 heaviest batteries were called up. Added to these were a few Austro-Hungarian heavy batteries, inadequately supplied with munitions.

In the prolonged preparations now carefully made, the attack front was kept as lifeless as possible, with the troops unchanged and the day-traffic kept down. Detrainments went on a long way to the rear on a wide front, and all movements of importance were held over until night time.

In March, each of the four groups of armies executed a first attack. In the Crown Prince Rupprecht's group the preparations were so elaborate in the region of Ypres and Armentieres that even the troops themselves and their leaders were convinced that a great attack was really imminent. The German Crown Prince's group made a show of preparing an attack in the neighbourhood of Reims. From the r4th onwards reconnaissance attacks, bombardment of the enemy headquarters, bombing by airmen and the bringing up of reinforcements, set in. The increased artillery activity continued until March 24. Gallwitz's group of armies carried out a great attack on Verdun systematically up to the stage when the infantry should have come in, with several days of artillery preparation, a gas attack, and the bombardment of railway stations behind the lines. Duke Albrecht's group feigned an attack on the Lorraine front, and carried out a heavy artillery battle from March 20 to 24.

The result of these German operations was to intensify the opponents' suspense to the utmost. The British put themselves in a position of defence against great attack between Armentieres and La Bassee and between Arras and St. Quentin, and shifted forces from Flanders to the south. The French evidently expected an attack at Reims. New defensive works arose everywhere in the chief opponents' lines. They reinforced their batteries and sought by increased activity on the part of the airmen and patrols, to penetrate the obscurity which enveloped the German mode of procedure.

In the front of the actual attack the Germans counted upon having, in front of the XVII. Army, 15 strong British divisions of the III. Army (General Byng), and in front of both armies 23 divisions of the V. Army (General Gough). The Germans assumed, further, that the leader of the combined operations of the Entente, General Foch, would have in readiness strong reserves, mainly French, somewhere in the region of Meaux behind the centre of the enemy front. The majority of the British reserves were supposed to be behind the centre of the British front. No signs of withdrawing were seen on the enemy's part.

A restricted foreground was counted upon.

The actual forming up for deployment of the attacking armies began on 1Iarch ro with the munitioning. The artillery deployment followed, and the attack divisions next moved into their positions at the front. Everything passed off smoothly and without any great counter-measures being taken by the defence.

All the difficulties due to compressing within a narrow space great masses of human beings and piles of utensils and contrivances were easily overcome. The divisions were organized in groups, usually three lines deep, the first line being made the strongest in order to ensure rapid results at the beginning. The first line advanced close up to the front trenches on March 20, the second standing at a distance of 3-5 km. and the third 7-10 km. behind. The hindermost lines were looked upon as reserves for the higher command. They were not simply to follow up the others but to be fetched up according to the needs of the tactical situation.

The Supreme Command held in readiness, besides the above mentioned three divisions at Denain, other reserves behind the remaining army fronts, and reserved to itself the right of withdrawing forces from the front line when necessary.

On March 20 the attack divisions, protected by aircraft, were drawn up behind the position from which the assault was to be made. The deployment of the artillery and minenwerfer was complete and the munitions in readiness. Only the order to advance had still to come. But here the weather threatened to upset all plans, for the direction of the wind was such as would spoil the effect of the artillery's gas, and the fog would make the attack movement difficult for the infantry. By 12 at midday the weather conditions had so far improved, however, that it was decided to carry out the attack on March 21. On that day, accordingly, at 3 :30 A.M., the gassing of the Allied batteries began. This was followed by a 3-hours' preliminary bombardment of the British positions by the German artillery and minenwerfer. At 9:40 A.M. the German infantry dashed forward to the attack. The mass of artillery then made a barrage, which, creeping gradually forward, was to pave a way for the infantry into the depths of the opposing trench system.

The attack itself turned out very differently at different points. In the XVII. Army, commanded by Otto von Below, the cooperation of infantry and artillery was not without its hitches. The barrage " ran away from the storming infantry," who only reached the opponent's first position and found itself in the evening before the strongly occupied second position. At Vaulx Vrancourt and to the N. of it, as also at Doignies, the British put up strong counter-attacks, to repel which several 2nd line German divisions had to be put in. The British defended themselves here with great stubbornness against the obvious danger of being shut off on the Cambrai bend.

The II. Army, commanded by von der Marwitz, pushed through to the line Gonzeaucourt-E. of Epehy-Templeux le Guerard-Le Verguier. Their main battle raged around the high-perched village of Epehy, which the Reserve Corps failed to take in spite of heroic efforts. With this army only a small portion of the second line divisions needed to be brought up. There were no serious counter-attacks.

The greatest success was achieved by the XVIII. Army, commanded by von Hutier. Its right wing pushed through the second British position and took the Holnon Wood. The centre got through beyond Savy, Dallon, Fontaine les Clercs, and the left wing took Urvillers, Essigny le Grand and Beney, and forced the Oise crossing. The XVIII. Army also took the most booty.

On the whole a great initial success had been achieved. Everything depended upon whether it could be successfully developed.

The German Supreme Command was determined to order the continuation of the attack according to the results of the first day's fighting. It allotted the first reinforcements brought up to the XVIII. Army and the left wing of the II. Army, directing the XVIII. to ease the advance of the II. by pushing forward on Tertry. The II. Army was likewise to put its weight upon the left wing. On the second day the fighting was heavy, the chief burden falling on the infantry. A systematic preliminary bombardment was impracticable on account of the progress made on the first day, and it was a difficult matter to pull the batteries through the obstacles and shelled areas. The heaviest and most thankless task was once more allotted to the XVII. Army. Its infantry penetrated the second British positions time after time, only to be forced back just as often by strong count er-attacks assisted by tanks. Not until the afternoon did they succeed, with considerable losses, in taking Croiselles, Vaulx Vrancourt and Morchies, and entering Hermies. To do this they had to be assisted by large portions of the third line. In the evening the army found itself once more up against another strongly held British position on the line Behagnies, BeugnatreBeugny.

The II. Army had also had more hard battles to win. It took Epehy and pushed forward as far as Fins-Longavesnes-Marquaix-Coulaincourt, capturing considerable booty. It was not able to interfere with the British evacuation of the Cambrai bend, owing to the slow progress made by the XVII. Army.

The XVIII. Army made a good advance encountering only slight resistance. It stormed Feuquieres and