the Week of Proper 2 / Ordinary 7
Click here to join the effort!
Bible Encyclopedias
Heligoland Bight
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "HELIGOLAND BIGHT. - The naval battle known as that of Heligoland Bight was fought in the Bight on Aug. 28 1914.
The original plan of the British operations included only the forces in the southern part of the North Sea, and took the form of a sweep to be carried out in the Bight by Commodore (T) and his Harwich flotillas, in conjunction with six submarines of Commodore (S), supported by the " Invincible " and " New Zealand" from the Humber and Cruiser Force (C). Three submarines were to be posted off Heligoland to attack any cruisers coming out, and three to the W. to entice enemy destroyers to come out. The Harwich flotillas were to come down from the N. of Heligoland, then turning W. sweep on a 9-mile front towards Terschelling, cutting off any craft patrolling to the W. of Heligoland. The operation was arranged for Aug. 28 and the operation orders went out on Aug. 25. When Adml. Jellicoe heard of it the next day, he proposed to send Vice-Adml. Beatty with the Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to cooperate. This was approved about midnight on Aug. 26, but there was no time to send a full draft of the operation orders N. and ViceAdml. Beatty, when he sailed from Scapa at 5:20 A.M. on Aug. 27, had only a rough outline of the proposed operation and the rendezvous of the Humber battle-cruisers. He was still in the dark as to the positions and intended movements of the submarines. This by itself would not have been a serious handicap, but unfortunately information of Beatty's cooperation was not sent out to Commodore (S) (Comm. Roger Keyes) and Commodore (T) (Comm. Reginald Tyrwhitt) till 1:10 P.M. on Aug. 27, by which time they had both sailed, and as the message was not signalled to them, they did not know that Beatty was taking part in the operations till they had actually begun.
By Aug. 27 the British forces were all on their way to the Bight, organized as follows: Sweeping Force. - " Arethusa," 1.e., 2 6-in., 6 4 - in., 27 knots; " Fearless," l.c., 10 4-in., 26 knots.
3rd Flotilla:-1st Div.: " Lookout " (Comm. A. B. S. Dutton), " Leonidas," " Legion," " Lennox "; 2nd Div.: " Lark " (Comm.
R. Rowley-Conwy), " Lance," " Linnet," " Landrail "; 3rd Div.: " Laforey " (Comm. G. R. Edwards), " Lawford," " Louis," " Lydiard "; 4th Div.: " Laurel " (Comm. F. F. Rose), " Liberty,". " Lysander," " Laertes." 1st Flotilla: 1st Div.: " Acheron " (Comm. Brien Money), " Attack," " Hind," " Archer "; 2nd Div.: " Ariel " (Comm. << " " " Dashwood Moir), Lucifer, Llewellyn 3rd Div.: Ferret (Comm. G. Mackworth), Forester, Druid, Defender, 5th Div.: " Goshawk " (Comm. Hon. Herbert Meade), " Lizard," " Lapwing," " Phoenix." Submarines. - Off Heligoland: E 4 (Lt.-Comm. Leir), E 5, E 9. To W. of Heligoland: E 6 (Lt.-Comm. C. P. Talbot), E 7 (Lt.-Comm. Feilmann), E 8, " Lurcher " Commodore (S), and " Firedrake." Supporting Force. - ist B.C.S. (Vice-Adml. Sir David Beatty): - " Lion " (flag), Capt. Alfred Chatfield, b.c., 8 13.5-in.; " Queen Mary," Capt. W. R. Hall, b.c., 8 13.5-in.; " Princess Royal," Capt. Osmond de B. Brock, b.c., 8 13.5-in.
1st L.C.S. (Comm. W. E. Goodenough): - " Southampton" (flag), Comm. E. Astley-Rushton, l.c., 8 6-in.; " Birmingham," Capt. Arthur A. Duff., l.c., 9 6-in.; " Falmouth," Capt. John D. Edwards, l.c., 8 6-in.; " Liverpool," Capt. Ed. Reeves, 2 6-in., 10 4-in.; Nottingham," Capt. Chas. B. Miller, l.c., 9 6-in.; " Lowestoft," Capt. T. W. Kennedy, l.c., 9 6-in.
Cruiser Force K (Rear-Adml. Sir Archibald G. Moore): - " Invincible " (flag), Capt. Chas. M. de Bartolome, b.c., 8 12-in.; " New Zealand," Capt. Lionel Halsey, b.c., 8 12-in.; attended by 1st Flotilla., 4th Div., " Badger " (Comm. Chas. Fremantle), " Beaver, " " Jackal," " Sandfly." In Reserve. - Cruiser Force K (Rear-Adml. Arthur Christian) :- " Euryalus " (flag), Capt. Eustace La. T. Leatham; " Bacchante," Rear-Adml. H. H. Campbell, Capt. Hon. Algernon Boyle; " Cressy," Capt. Robert Johnson; " Hogue," Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson; " Aboukir," Capt. John E. Drummond; all a.c., 2 9.2-in., 12 6-in.; and " Amethyst," Capt. Bertram Thesiger, 12 4-in.
It was light at 4 A.M. Comm. Tyrwhitt had met Comm. Goodenough and the ist L.C.S. at daybreak, and at first mistook him for the enemy, but his challenge was answered and the cruisers recognized in time to prevent an accident. By 5 A.M. the sun was rising, and the forces were in position some 60 m. N. of Heligoland. The flotillas went off at 20 knots, the " Arethusa " and 3rd flotilla ahead, with the " Fearless " and 1st flotilla 2 m. astern. They were in cruising order, with divisions in line ahead disposed abeam, half a mile apart. Eight m. behind came the ist L.C.S. with its six light cruisers in three divisions, 2 m. apart. The 1st B.C.S. was some 30 m. to the westward. On reaching a point about 12 1n. W. of Heligoland, as he should do about 8 A.M., it was Tyrwhitt's intention to turn W. and sweep down the Bight, while the cruiser squadrons supported his movements.
Let us glance now at the German dispositions. Though their strategical policy was largely based on the idea of the British fleet invading the Bight, the actual attack came as a complete surprise. Posted round Heligoland in a semicircle they had two lines of patrols, an outer line of nine destroyers of the ist flotilla 25 m. from the fortress, and an inner line of older vessels of the 3rd Minesweeping Div. 13 in. from it. These were supported b}' another torpedo flotilla (the 5th) at Heligoland, three cruisers on outpost duty and a battleship in the mouth of the Jade.
Their detailed disposition was as follows: - Outpost, Outer Line: 1st Flotilla, G 193, G196, G 194, V 187, V 188, V 190, V 191, G 197, V 189. Outpost, Inner Line: 3rd Minesweeping Div. D 8, T 25, T 29, T 3 1, T33, T34, T35, T36, T37, (?), T 4 o (?), T71 (?) Cruisers in support :" Stettin " (10 4.1-in., 23 knots), off Heligoland, with Chief of 2nd U. Flotilla; " Frauenlob " (10 4.1-in., 19 knots), off the Jade; " Hela " (4 152-pdr., 16 knots), N.E. of Heligoland. Battleship in support: " Heligoland " (12 12-in.), Jade river, inside outer bar. T.B. in support: 5th Flotilla in Heligoland; Submarines U5, U16, U25 and three others in Heligoland; U24, U 28 off Heligoland. In Wilhelmshaven Roads: - Cruisers: " Ariadne " (1900, 2,660 tons, 10 4.1-in., 19 knots); " Kolberg " (12 4.1-in., 25 knots); Battle Cruisers: "Seydlitz " (10 11-in., 251 knots, port engine disabled, under repair); 1st S.G., " Moltke " (io 11-in., 252 knots); " Von der Tann " (8 i 1-in., 252 knots); " Blucher " (12 8.2-in., 231 knots). Battleships: 1st Squadron, " Ostfriesland," " Oldenburg " and "Thuringen " (relieved " Helgoland " about 8:30 A.M.); 3rd Squadron, " Prinz Reg. Luitpold," " Kaiser," " Kaiserin," " Konig Albert." In Wilhelmshaven: - " Coln " (Rear-Adml. Leberecht Maas, Flotilla Admiral; 1909, 4,350 tons, 12 4.1-in., 241 knots, coaling); " Strassburg " (12 4.1-in., 26 knots); " Stralsund " (12 4.1-in., 26 knots); " Rostock " (2nd Leader, Flotillas), 12 4.1-in., 26 knots; " Hamburg " (Chief of 1st U. Flotilla), in dock.
In the Elbe :-2nd Squadron (Deutschlands).
At Brunsbuttel: - " Danzig," " Munchen " (io 4.1-in., 20 knots). Off the Ems: - " Mainz " (1909, 4,35 o tons, 12 4.1-in., 25 knots).
The movements of all the heavy German, ships were governed by one dominant consideration - the time of low water on the outer Jade bar. This fell at 9:33 A.M., and though there is not a word of the tide in any operation orders or despatches, it could hardly have occurred more fortunately for the British attack, for it meant that between 7 A.M. and noon no German battle cruiser or battleship could put to sea, a striking instance of the serious handicap imposed on the Germans by their river harbours.
The first signal of anything unusual came in at 5:26 A.M. The British submarine E 7 had fired a torpedo at G 194 about 4:45 A.M. and on the report reaching the " Seydlitz " about 5:26, Rear-Adml. Maas, the German Flotilla Admiral, was ordered to send out the 5th Flotilla to look for the submarine, and they left Heligoland for this purpose at 6:45 A.M. Such was the situation just before the British forces came on the scene. The sea was smooth, with a light wind from N.W., the sk y overcast and weather dull. At 6:53 A.M. the " Arethusa " struck the outer patrol line, and, seeing G 194 on the port bow about 3z m. away, sent her flying towards Heligoland with the 4th Div. of the 1st Flotilla (" Laurel," " Liberty," " Lysander " and " Laertes ") in chase. G 196, the next German boat on patrol to the N., sighted the British cruisers and reported them at 7:6, but the report from G 194 did not get through till about 7:30 A.M. V 187, the German flotilla leader's boat, to the S. of G 194, had also sighted two destroyers, possibly the " Lurcher " and " Firedrake," and two cruisers on a S.E. course, and sent in a report of them. The " Laurel's " division drew away to E., and at 7:26 Comm. Tyrwhitt turned to port to support them. The " Fearless," 2 m. astern of him, followed suit. A few minutes later the German 5th Flotilla was sighted coming up from Heligoland, and turned back hotly pursued. Between 7:45 and 8 A.M. it became clear to the German Admiral of Scouting Forces that a considerable force of British destroyers had penetrated the Bight and at 7:47 the " Stettin " and " Frauenlob " were ordered to proceed in support. The " Stettin " had already weighed at 7:32 and by 7:58 was under way, though she had not raised steam in all boilers. Orders were also issued to the " Coln " and " Strassburg " to support, to the " Kolberg " to get steam up, and to the " Stralsund " to proceed to the Roads. The German 5th Flotilla was being slowly overtaken and was crying for cruiser help (7:45).
The chief of the German 2nd S/M Flotilla, on board the " Stettin," ordered U 25 to take up a position at the N. end of "the Heligoland - Weser line; the remainder of the German submarines, U 5, U 16, U 24, U 28, as they became available, were sent towards the Jade to guard the entrance of the river. The alarm had gone in Heligoland and the 8-in. guns were manned at 7:30 A.M.; by 7:50 A.M. the whole fortress was standing to. The pursuit was rapidly approaching the island, and the British flotillas were gradually overhauling the rear destroyers of the German 5th Flotilla. S 13 and V 1 were falling behind; the latter's range had fallen to 3,900 yd., and at 7:50 a 4-in. shot penetrated her stokehold, reducing her speed to 20 knots; another shot got home on the starboard side, damaging the steering connexions, and the British destroyers were gradually drawing closer when the " Stettin " arrived on the scene at 7:58 A.M. and opened fire at 9,200 yards. At 8:5 A.M. the " Fearless " was sighted, and the " Stettin," breaking off the action, retired behind Heligoland to get steam up for full speed, while the " Fearless " turned to W.4S. at 8:12. The brief respite, however, had enabled the German 5th Flotilla to get clear, and they were now streaming down towards Heligoland, though some of the 3rd Minesweeping Div., which had formed the inner patrol line, were not so fortunate. They came under a heavy fire from the " Arethusa," and D 8 was hit by a 6-in. shot which killed the captain, lieutenant and doctor and disabled a score of men. T J3 too was brought to a standstill, but at 8:8 A.M. the "Frauenlob," which had left the Jade on hearing the guns, suddenly arrived on the scene from the S., and engaged the "Arethusa " on a S.W. course. The range fell from 6,000 to 4,000 yd., and the " Arethusa," which had only commissioned the previous day, suffered severely. Lt. Eric Westmacott, the signal officer, was killed by the commodore's side. Only the forecastle 6-in. gun remained in action, and one officer and 8 men were killed. The " Frauenlob " did not go unscathed. She received about io hits and five dead and 32 wounded. About 8:25 the " Arethusa " turned to W. 4 S., and the " Frauenlob " turned to S. and broke off the action.
The approach to Heligoland and the engagements with the ” Stettin " and "Frauenlob " may be called the first phase of the action. By 8:30 A.M. it was over and both the flotillas were proceeding to the W., the " Fearless " some 6 m. to the N. of the " Arethusa." Goodenough's light cruisers were about 12 M. to the W. and had also turned W. at 8:30. Beatty's battle cruisers were about 45 m. off to the north-west. The original plan had miscarried. The German patrols, instead of being swept to the W., had broken back and had all reached home with one exception. As the " Fearless " made to the W., she sighted V 187 at 8:15. This was the German flotilla leader's boat, and the 5th Div. of the British 1st Flotilla went off in chase. V 187 ran to the S.W., hoping to make the Jade and Ems, when at 8:45 the " Lowestoft " and " Nottingham," which had been detached by Comm. Goodenough to support the flotillas, suddenly emerged to the N.W. and opened a heavy fire at 4,300 yd., hitting her for the first time. The captain turned to the N. to break past the pursuing destroyers. He had passed them and was about to turn to the E. when the 3rd Div. of the 1st Flotilla came down on him from the north. He was now enveloped in a heavy fire from three sides. One shot put the foremost gun out of action, another penetrated the stokehold, another struck the bridge. The boat was brought to a standstill, and was sunk by the " Goshawk," " Phoenix " and " Ferret " at 9:10 A.M. The " Defender " had lowered boats to rescue the survivors, but the " Stettin," which had now got steam up, sighting V 187's smoke, reappeared on the scene, too late to help her but in time to scatter the destroyers, though she received one or two hits in doing so. The " Defender," in the hurry and scurry, had to leave her boats behind, but E 4 (Lt.-Comm. Leir), after making an unsuccessful attack on the " Stettin," waited till she was out of the way, then suddenly emerged, rescued the " Defender's " men, took an officer and a couple of V 187's men " as a sample," gave the remainder a compass to find their way to Heligoland, then submerged as suddenly as she came.
At 8:55 the " Fearless," making W., had sighted the " Are
'Heligoland Bight ' 'St , -,Floti Llas 8.30 A. M. m ?1 i ?, s /; ' ,/ --„, ?
' - ?
E? - I.C.S. >, ' ? / p ? ny187 ,,;?;.?; :. ` ? -:?,', To ?
8., lsy3 l 4.04. ' ', thusa," and both flotillas were now 12 to 15 m. W. of Heligoland steering W.4 S. To Commodore (S), who did not know of the presence of Goodenough's cruisers, the situation appeared confused. He had sighted Goodenough's light cruisers at 7:45 and reported them as the enemy, leading Goodenough to look for an enemy where there was none, and now about 9:40 A.M., seeing Goodenough coming up behind him, he reported he was being chased by four enemy cruisers. Tyrwhitt, getting the signal, turned boldly round at 9:42 A.M. to help him, and proceeded E. again. At however, the mist lifted for a time and Comm. Keyes recognized Goodenough's cruisers. But he now became concerned for his submarines. The " Southampton " had already attempted to ram E6, and Goodenough, after seeing Keyes, sent a signal to Beatty and withdrew to the W., leaving the field clear for the submarines. The "Arethusa, " after proceeding to the E. for 8 m. with the " Fearless " and flotillas, stopped and proceeded to repair damages. A lull of half an hour now ensued in the operations. The " Arethusa " had stopped and Goodenough's cruisers had withdrawn.
By this time the Germans were beginning to appreciate the situation. At 8:20 A.M. the German C.-in-C., Adml. von Ingenohl, had taken over the command from Rear-Adml. Hipper, the Admiral of Scouting Forces, and had ordered the battle cruisers to raise steam and be prepared to go out as soon as the bar would permit. The German light cruisers, eager to attack, had pushed out one by one as soon as they could get up steam. The " Strassburg " had passed the Outer Jade at 9:34 A.M., the " Coln " (Rear-Adml. Maas) at io A.M., the "Ariadne " (ordered out at 10:33) at 10:50, the " Stralsund " at 11:20, the " Kolberg " at noon. They now began to appear on the scene. At 10:40 the " Arethusa " had got under way again, and was making to the W. when the " Strassburg," which had been making strenuous efforts to get in touch with the " Stettin," was sighted to the S.E., coming up on a N.N.W. course. Fire was opened and the flotillas turned to attack, but the " Strassburg," evidently unwilling to close, went off to the N. and disappeared in the mist. At 11:5 the " Coln " appeared to the S.E., and they turned to engage her, but after a few salvoes she passed on. At 11:16 the " Strassburg " reappeared to the N., and, steering a westerly course, opened a heavy fire at about 8,650 yd. The " Lookout," with the ist Div. followed by the 2nd Div., went off to attack her at 11:3 5 A.M. Two of their torpedoes crossed her path, and, driven off by the flotillas, she disappeared in the mist.
The flotillas rejoined the " Arethusa " and continued their course to the westward. When the " Coln " appeared Tyrwhitt had asked for support, and when the " Strassburg " came in sight the second time, Capt. Blunt, foreseeing a concentration of German light cruisers, sent an urgent signal for assistance.
Beatty meanwhile had been steaming round a position about 54° 28' N., 6° 20' E. The situation was obscure to him, but at 10 A.M. he made a general signal to all ships giving his position 54° 26' N., 6° 14' E., and adding: " Remaining here," so that they might know where to find him.
The final and decisive phase of the action was now about to begin. Between 11 and 11:30 Beatty received three calls for assistance. At 11:20 he had ordered Goodenough to go to Tyrwhitt's assistance. Then came Capt. Blunt's signal couched in urgent terms, and Beatty decided to take his whole force into the Bight. The ” Arethusa " was some 40 m. away, and at 11:24 he formed his battle cruisers in single line ahead, and, working up to full speed, proceeded to E.S.E., to throw his whole force into the issue of the day.
Meanwhile the " Mainz " had left the Ems shortly after 9 A.M. and was making at full speed to the E. to cut off the British destroyers and to get in touch with the " Strassburg " and " Stettin." At i i :30 she was sighted almost right ahead by the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divs. of the British ist Flotilla as they came W., with the " Fearless " and " Arethusa " some miles behind them. The " Mainz " turned to the N. and chased the destroyers to the N., bringing them under a heavy fire. But at 11 :50 the situation suddenly changed. Out of the mist, on the port bow of the 1st Flotilla, there appeared four light cruisers steaming S.S.E. at high speed. These were Goodenough's cruisers coming down from the N.N.W. in support. For a few minutes the destroyers were doubtful whether they were friend or foe, then they recognized them as British and turned gleefully to join them. The " Mainz " recognized them too, and, turning sharply round, fled to the southward. The ist L.C.S. opened fire, but the range was over 7,000 yd. and the " Mainz " drew away, reporting that she was being chased by a battle cruiser. The signal was received at 12:5 P.M. and the " Moltke " and " Von der Tann " were ordered to proceed, with the German 8th Flotilla to screen them. At 12 :8 P.M. the " Mainz," running S.E., sighted the " Fearless " and 3rd Flotilla. She swung round to S. and the 1st and 2nd Divs. of the British 3rd Flotilla turned to N. and the 4th Div. to S. to engage her.
A shot, possibly from the " Fearless," damaged the " Mainz's " rudder and brought her port engine to a stop. She now concentrated on the 4th Division. The " Laurel " was hit by her first salvo; the fourth detonated a number of lyddite shells and blew away the after-funnel, and the " Laurel," with her captain severely wounded, crawled away, hidden by the steam and smoke pouring out of her funnel. The " Liberty " ran into the zone of fire, and had her mast shot away and her captain, Lt.-Comm. Nigel Barthelot, killed. The "Laertes" was hit four times by a single salvo at 4,000 yd. and was stopped dead. But a torpedo fired by the 4th Div. had hit the " Mainz " on the port side amidships. Goodenough's cruisers were closing rapidly and, opening a deadly fire, they reduced her quickly to a wreck. At 12:25 they ceased fire, and at 1:8 the " Mainz " settled by the bows and sank.
The position was still far from clear. The flotillas were scattered. Two German cruisers, the " Strassburg " and " Coln," had appeared to the N.E. and opened a heavy fire, and the German forces seemed to be concentrating to the northward. But in a few minutes everything was changed. Out of the mist there emerged Beatty's four great battle cruisers steaming at high speed. They swept past the sinking " Mainz," and on to the N.E., Goodenough with his cruisers following in their wake. The German cruisers saw them and fled, but it was too late. At 12:37 the " Coln " appeared on the port bow, and the " Lion " opened fire at 3,800 yards. The " Coln " steered desperately to the N.E., but was hit by a heavy shell and her engines disabled. She gained a brief respite, for the " Ariadne " was sighted by the " Lion " trying to cross her bows on a S.E. course in a despairing effort to escape. Her end came quickly. She was hit by the first two salvoes and disappeared in the mist to the S.E., on fire and sinking. Beatty now decided to withdraw, and at 1:10 P.M. made the signal to retire.
The " Lion " circled round to the N. and sighted the " Coln " again at 1:25 P.M. steering slowly to the S.W. The admiral had fallen, her captain was seriously wounded. The " Lion " sent a 13.5-in. shell into her; she listed to port and sank with her flag flying, at 2:35. By this time both the " Stettin " and " Strassburg " had reported the presence of battle cruisers, and 1P.
ii BEA ' '[[Bight 2 Beatty$ Entry]] y.? 9.0 u B;? at r :50 the German light cruisers were ordered to fall back on the Moltke " and " Von der Tann." At 2 P.M. the German battle cruisers passed the bar of the Outer Jade. The German ist and 3rd Squadrons were now getting up steam, and the German battle cruisers were ordered not to advance against the British squadron (2:41 P.M.) but to wait for the " Seydlitz " 25 m. W. of Heligoland. By 3:50 the three battle cruisers had reached that position, and had been joined by the " Strassburg," " Kolberg " and " Stralsund." There were no signs of the enemy. The squadron turned back before reaching the position where the " Coln " went down, and no survivors were found that day. A single stoker was picked up by a torpedo-boat on Aug. 30. Four others had managed to get hold of a battered dinghy, but he alone survived.
For the British it remained only to get home. Adml. Campbell's cruisers met the " Lurcher," with the " Mainz's " crew on board, escorting the " Laurel " and " Liberty," at 4:30 P.M., and the " Laurel " was taken in tow by the " Amethyst." The " Arethusa " struggled on at 6 knots till 7 P.M., then had to signal for assistance, and at 9 :30 P.M. was taken in tow by the " Hogue " and reached home safely.
Mist, uncertainty arising from the appearance of British light cruisers, and the speed of the enemy's light cruisers militated against the success of the British submarines. E 7 had begun the day by firing a torpedo at G 194, had sighted the 1st L.C.S. at io A.M. and recognized them as British; she had seen the " Danzig " later at 12:40, and at 1:15 had sighted Beatty's battle cruisers, which passed over her - this probably gave rise to the report of an attack on the " Queen Mary." E 4 had fired a torpedo at the " Stettin," picked up the " Defender's " men and seen the " Ariadne " going W. at 12 :io P.M. E 6 had been attacked by the " Southampton " at 9 :30, had watched the action between the " Mainz " and the flotillas, and had prepared to attack a fourfunnelled cruiser at I :45, only to recognize it just in time as the " Liverpool." The German submarines had all been held back off Heligoland by the chief of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla, and the reports of attacks by them on the British were fictitious. When, at noon, it was clear that battle cruisers had entered the Bight, the German submarines were ordered by the chief of the ist Submarine Flotilla to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Heligoland, but as the enemy was 35 m. off and it would have taken them at least four hours to reach him, the order was ineffective.
The engagement was a severe blow to the German fleet. They had lost three light cruisers and one destroyer, and their casualties were 63 officers and 649 men killed, 20 officers and 361 men wounded, 9 officers and 140 men prisoners, a total of 1,242, against the British 35 killed and some 40 wounded. The Germans had at first expected the British fleet to enter the Bight, but as days passed without a sign of it they became less circumspect and Beatty caught them off their guard. In these circumstances they had only two courses before them - either to keep everything back or send everything out. As it was, the light cruisers had proceeded independently and had fallen victims to greatly superior forces. The exposure of the patrols to sudden attack entailed one of two policies - to keep heavy ships continuously on patrol and tie them to the defence of the rivers, or to lay minefields to cover the approaches. The latter policy was adopted and mines began to be laid to the W. of Heligoland in September 1914. The engagement had a further effect, for it confirmed the Kaiser in his determination to limit the German fleet to a strictly defensive policy. When Beatty swooped down on the Bight he drove a great wedge into German naval policy. Von Tirpitz, whose son had been taken prisoner in the " Mainz," wearied himself 'with plaints, but all in vain. For the British nation and navy the victory came, too, at an opportune time. The irresistible advance of the German army was being viewed with something like dismay. The news of a naval victory in the very gates of the enemy lightened the gloom and gave the nation 'faith that the navy was equal to its gigantic task. It gave the navy, too, confidence in its leaders. They knew that where they were Beatty also would be. Many a day was to pass before, on another misty day, also in the mouth of another river, Beatty was to look on a very different scene, but the first naval laurels of the war were gained in the Bight, and this naval action ranks as one of the most important of the World War. (A. C. D.)
These files are public domain.
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Heligoland Bight'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/h/heligoland-bight.html. 1910.
