the Week of Proper 19 / Ordinary 24
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Bible Encyclopedias
Serbian Campaigns
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS. - Although the Balkan area developed into one of the side-shows of the World War, it was there that it started in 1914 with the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Serbia. The 1914 operations and the conquest of Serbia in 1915 are narrated in separate sections below. Under Salonika Campaigns an account is given separately of the Allied operations on the southern Serbian front, 1915-8.
I. Operations In 1914 The Austro-Hungarian military problem in starting a campaign against Serbia was complicated by the prospect of a Russian intervention in Galicia. The alternatives were: to defeat Serbia completely before the Russian threat became deadly, or to stand on the defensive against Serbia till after a great battle had decided the issue in Galicia.
The strategic geography of Serbia was, in its broad lines, simple. On the N. side there is the formidable obstacle of the Danube and Sava, on the W. the line of the Drina, a river not very broad, but rapid and difficult to bridge, these rivers forming the actual frontier.' Initially then the assailant must begin by forcing a river barrier, whatever the direction of his advance, and his power to do so depended: (a) on the communications on his own side of the river, which would enable him to collect the troops and material for forcing the passage; (b ) on the barrier itself; and (c ) on the defensive positions available for the Serbs inside the barrier. Taking all these factors together, an attack on the northern barrier offered the best chances of success. It was the course chosen by Prince Eugene in 1717 and by Mackensen in 1916, and it was that which the Serbs themselves regarded as most likely to be taken in August 1914. The reasons which led the Austrian commander to choose differently will be considered presently. More important than the choice of a point at which the barriers could most easily be forced was the choice of a direction for the subsequent advance. The objectives were plain enough, the defeat of the Serbian field army and the occupation of the most important part of the country. Without the attainment of these objectives, Austria could not pretend to have conquered, or even to have defeated, Serbia. Both, however, were attainable by an invasion of the Belgrade-Pozharevats-KraguyevatsKrushevats region, conventionally called the Morava valley. This was the richest part of the country, and the centre of all its communications. Here and here only could the Serbian army be definitely brought to action under conditions in which the Austrian superiority of numbers would be effective.
This region could be approached from the N. (Belgrade or Danube-Pozharevats front), from the N.W. (Sava and Lower Drina front), from the W. (Middle Drina front) or from the S.W. (Upper Drina front). 2 The first named was the most direct route. For the forcing of the Danube 3 five railheads on the Hungarian side were available, for the prosecution of the advance the Orient railway (Belgrade-Constantinople) and various branches of it. The country was rich in local supplies, populous, and relatively well provided with roads, and the general trend of the natural features, governing that of the lines of communication, was from N. to S. On the other hand, the defender would of course be best prepared for attack on this front, and the Danube obstacle was here most difficult to overcome, in spite of the command of the water ensured by the Austrian monitors.4 Next in importance were the lines of advance from the Sava and Lower Drina, and especially those from the Sava, since the Drina valley was totally destitute of railway approaches on the Hungarian side. In the angle of the Sava and Drina lies the fertile plain of the Machva; many favourable points exist on the Sava for the forcing of a crossing, and the town of Shabats in particular offers a choice of tolerable roads leading S. to the slopes of the Tser (Cer) range S.W. to Valyevo, and W. to Arangyelovats, the last-named route conducting an invader to either Palanka or Kraguyevats in the Morava region. In conjunction with such an advance, an operation on the left, over the Lower Kolubara, supplied from the Sava, would lead to the rear of Belgrade, while on the other flank a successful operation by troops organized for mountain warfare by Valyevo over the Kolubara and Rudnik ranges to Gorni Milanovats and Chachak would threaten the rear of the whole Morava region. As a way of turning the great obstacle of the Danube front, the lines of advance grouped on the axis Shabats-Arangyelovats possessed tempting advantages. But, considered from the point of view of supply, the disadvantages were very serious. Not only was this the longest route 'In its upper course the Drina passes inside the Austrian frontier, and direct advance into Serbia is therefore possible from the region of Vishegrad. But this roadless, mountainous region is quite unfitted for the movements of large forces.
2 Attack from the stretch of the Danube front lying in the mountains between Weisskirchen and the Iron Gates was regarded by both sides as outside the limits of probability.
The lowest reaches of the Sava are usually considered as belonging to this front.
4 Six in number, armed with 4.7-in. guns, and armoured.
The small line connecting Shabats with Loznitsa was of no importance except in the case of stabilized trench warfare in the Machva.
between the railheads of deployment and the final objective, but it was destitute of railways E. of the Kolubara. West of that river, indeed, the line Valyevo-Arangyelovats-Palanka lay in the very axis of the march, and a branch-line connected this with Obrenovats on the Sava, where water-borne supplies could be unloaded. But the barrier of the Kolubara and the ridge behind it had to be mastered before this branch could be used, and it was certain that the Serbs could assemble in time to fight on the Kolubara line if not W. of it. That is, from deployment to the first great battle the campaign would have to be carried out with road transport, and in the case of the rightmost routes (axis Valyevo-Chachak) pack transport only.
From the Middle Drina (Lyeshnitsa-Lyuboviya front) all routes converge on Valyevo, at the head of the Kolubara. Thence operations towards Arangyelovats, Gorni Milanovats and Chachak would take the course already discussed. But up to Valyevo operations would lie wholly in mountainous country 6 and would depend for supply almost entirely on pack transport from distant railheads - for in Bosnia the railways come to an end 25-27 m. W. of the Drina, and from that river to Valyevo is a further 32 miles. All arguments against the choice of the Shabats route therefore applied with far greater force to the Valyevo route. Farther S., in the region of Vishegrad, operations into Old Serbia by way of Uzhitse might gain a footing, or help a Valyevo force to gain a footing, at Chachak. But such operations would be mountain warfare pure and simple. Although in this part the railway runs right up to the frontier, no body of troops large enough to deal with the Serbian army could be collected and fed in the upper valley of the western Morava, either by way of Uzhitse or by way of Valyevo. As a threat to the flank and rear of a beaten Serbian army retreating up the Morava valley, such manceuvres might be effective; but to the beating of that army they could contribute practically nothing. Operations from Vishegrad into New Serbia would be too eccentric to have the slightest influence upon the conflict of armies in the Morava valley, and the same would apply to operations from Focha or from the Herzegovina against Montenegro, supposing that state to join Serbia in resisting the Austrian advance. Operations in this quarter would be scarcely more than guerrilla.
On a review of the conditions, then, the most logical plan of campaign from the Austrian point of view would be a frontal operation S. from the Danube front, coupled with an enveloping movement from the Sava (or Sava-Lower Drina) front directed on Arangyelovats, the latter either preceding the other by some days and seeking to surprise possession of the Kolubara ridge, or following it and directed to the flank and rear of an ascertained position of the enemy. Loosely connected with these main operations an advance from the Middle Drina or Vishegrad or both on Chachak and the western Morava had advantages for the exploitation of victory, but not for the winning of it. Such a plan was proposed before the war in the Austrian staff, and practically the same plan was assumed by the Serbians as the basis of their defensive deployment. Whether any or all of these operations could be carried through before the Russians intervened, or before their intervention became dangerous, would depend on available time. If no time at all were available, a pure defensive was the only course. If time for a thorough conquest, all the operations above mentioned with proper proportioning of strength would contribute something to a decisive success. In any intermediate conditions, one or more of the subsidiary operations would be omitted from the plan, and, especially, if a minimum time were available only the direct S. attack from the Danube front would be admissible, with or without a collateral attempt by light forces from Shabats or Obrenovats to seize the Kolubara ridge.
The calculation of this available time depended principally upon the arrangements made between the Austrian and the German staffs for initial operations in Poland, Galicia and E. Prussia. For this a plan had been drawn up by Conrad von Hotzendorf and Moltke in consultation; and, on the basis of this plan, 8 Even the Yadar valley road was in many places unsuitable for wheeled transport.
the scheme of operations adopted against Serbia was apparently the full scheme outlined above; concentric advance from all the fronts in varying strengths and at various dates. Nearly half the army was placed in position for this advance, and the Austrian supreme headquarters intended to conduct the campaign itself. But at the last moment, it is asserted, the Germans, rightly or wrongly, changed their minds, the allies' scheme for Poland and Galicia fell to pieces, and, in trying to adapt their plans to the new conditions, the Austrians threw their S.E. forces into confusion before they had even deployed. The responsibility for a grave initial blunder, then, lies ultimately with Moltke, if he failed to keep his promise, or with Conrad, if he interpreted a mere interchange of views as a binding engagement. In any case the effect was to withdraw the forces on the San - Danube front to another theatre amid the battle for the river crossings.
The Yadar Campaign
The deployment, carried out according to the original scheme,' in spite of the fact that, at some date not yet known, it had been decided to make a radical alteration, was as follows: II. Army. - General of Cavalry Bohm-Ermolli on the Danube - Sava front from Weisskirchen to Mitrowitz (Mitrovicza). Left to right - VII. Corps (34th and 17th Divs.); 7th Div.; IV. Corps (32nd and 31st Divs.); IX. Corps (29th Div. only); 10th Cavalry Division. In reserve 23rd Honved Division. Total: 131 battalions, 42 squadrons, 56 batteries.
V. A rmy. - General of Infantry Liborius von Frank. On the Lower Drina from mouth to Lyuboviya, and left to right - VIII. Corps (9th Div., 21st Landwehr Div. and combined brigade); XI I I. Corps (36th Div., 42nd Honved Div., one brigade, one mountain brigade). Total: 79 battalions, 15 squadrons, 39 batteries.
VI. Army. - Feldzeugmeister Potiorek. Vishegrad-Focha region, left to right - XV. Corps (1st and 48th Div. staffs with 4 mountain brigades); XIV. Corps (18th Div. staff and 6 mountain brigades); in reserve 40th Honved Division. Detached, facing Montenegro, 47th Div. and 3rd Mountain Brigade. Total: 74 battalions, 5 squadrons, 40 batteries.
Each army had in addition one Landsturm brigade and the V. and II. one to three " march " (i.e., reinforcement) brigades.
Of these forces the II. Army was withdrawn on Aug. 14, 2 leaving the others in full battle on the Drina. That this battle was in being, however, was due not to Conrad, who - naturally, under the changed conditions - ordered the " Balkan Forces " to stand on the defensive, but to "Feldzeugmeister" Potiorek, commander-in-chief as well as commander of the VI. Army. This officer, high in favour at Court, had been for some years viceroy in Bos- nia-Herzegovina, and regarded the problem from the standpoint of the Sarajevo residency rather than from that of a military headquarters faced with a military problem. He saw above everything else the possibility of the Serbians advancing over the Drina to excite insurrection among their brothers and cousins, although there was nothing in the layout of the Serbian deployment to suggest this, and he not only kept the centre of gravity of the forces on the Drina, but, on his own responsibility, launched a "preventive" offensive on this unfavourable front.
On the Serbian side, general mobilization had been ordered on July 25, months since the demobilization that marked the end of the Balkan Wars. Of a population of about 3,100,000 in Old Serbia and about 1,800,000 in New Serbia (where there had been no time to set up the administrative machinery of conscription), 4 8 9,5 00 men were mobilized at the outset and some 43,000 more between August and September.
On Aug. 5 1914 Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hungary. Her forces amounted to about 50,000 militia with very little artillery, and were of no direct assistance to Serbia. But they occupied the attention of three mountain brigades of the enemy's army and, what was perhaps more important, they added considerably to Potiorek's politico-military anxieties.
Strategically, there were three possible courses open to the Serbs: the defensive in their own country, the offensive W. into Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia, and the offensive N. into Hungary; but the first course was the only one practicable. An offen ' The III. Corps (6th and 28th Divs., 22nd Landwehr Div.), however, which mobilized with the other seven corps, did not proceed to the Serbian front, but was dispatched to the Dniester at once 2 It arrived in Galicia too late for the crisis there.
sive into Bosnia, even with Montenegrin aid, could only have succeeded if the populations there had been ready to rise at the first signal, which they were not. Politically, it would have played into the hands of the enemy by showing the world that Austria's fear of Serbian ambitions had been justifiable. Militarily, an offensive over the Drina presented the same supply difficulties in either direction. An offensive into Hungary, whether to the right or left of the Danube, must begin with the forcing of the Danube or the Sava, and in view of the disproportion between the opposed forces had no chance of success unless the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian army were at the same time closely engaged in Galicia and Poland. In the initial stages of the operations at any rate, therefore, such a movement was out of the question.
The strategy adopted was, therefore, purely defensive, in spite of the offensive victories of 1912-3 and the mania for the offensive at all costs and in all conditions which then pervaded almost every army in Europe.
The order of battle was as follows, the Crown Prince Alexander being commander-in-chief, and Voivode R. Putnik chief-of-staff, with headquarters at Kraguyevats: I. Army. - General Boyovich. Divisions Timok I., Timok II., Morava II., Danube II., 52 battalions, 7 squadrons, 26 batteries: approximate strength 55,000, grouped about Palanka and Racha and Topola.
H. Army. - General Stepanovich. Divisions Shumaja I., Morava I., Danube I., and " Combined Division." 64 battalions, to squadrons, 33 batteries, about 71,000 men. Grouped about Arangyelovats, Lazarevats, Belgrade.
III. Army. - General Yurichich-Sturm. Divisions Drina I., Drina II., 28 battalions, 5 squadrons, 16 batteries, about 32,000. Grouped around Valyevo.
Uzhitse Army. - General Boyanovich. Division Shumaja II., Uzhitse Brigade, 24 battalions, 2 squadrons, II batteries, about 26,000. Grouped at Uzhitse and Bainabashta.
Independent Cavalry Division. - Sixteen squadrons, one battery, about 3,000 concentrated at Ub.
Belgrade Group. - About 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, to batteries. Obrenovats Group. - About It battalions, 51batteries.
Other frontier troops, in all about 25 battalions, 13 batteries.
In infantry, therefore, the Serbians had about 213 battalions to pit against the 272 of the enemy's II., V. and VI. Armies. On the other hand, nine out of ten of the men in these 213 battalions had fought in the wars of 1912-3. In artillery the opposed forces were nearly equal, about fro Serbian to about 130 AustroHungarian; three-quarters of the Serbian guns were of a better model than the Austrian, and some heavy artillery was available. On the other hand, the equipment of the Austrians and their resources in ammunition and stores were much superior, for Serbia was nearly isolated, the one available arsenal was small, and stocks depleted in the Balkan Wars had not been made good.
In sum, then, it would appear that the Austrian expeditionary force - even counting the II. Army which appeared only to be withdrawn, and the III. Corps which did not appear at all - was none too strong for the defeat of the Serbian field army, let alone its destruction. And as soon as it had been decided to withdraw the II. Army, replacing it by a mere screen along the Danube, it was or should have been obvious that the 141 battalions, 17 squadrons and 70 batteries of the V. and VI. Armies were far too weak a force to attempt an offensive into difficult country held by superior numbers of well-trained and war-experienced troops. Potiorek, however, decided otherwise.
From July 26 to August II only minor incidents took place - bombardments of Belgrade and other places by the monitors, raids over the river for reconnaissance purposes. Then, on the night of August 11-12, the Austrian main bodies began to cross on a wide front at Drenovats (near Shabats) on the Sava, several points between Lyeshnitsa and Loznitsa on the Lower Drina, and Zvornik and Lyuboviya on the Middle Drina. On the 12th the frontier troops of the Drina defence were pushed back concentrically in the general direction of Valyevo, those of the Sava defence driven out of Shabats. E. of that point the II. Army, under orders for Galicia, remained inactive except for the seizure of Gipsy Island (Ostrovo Tsiganlya) close above Belgrade, while in and S. of the Vishegrad region the XV. and XVI. Austrian corps were preoccupied by the activity of the Uzhitse army,' and the Montenegrins.2 During the 12th and following days the Serbian headquarters became convinced that nothing was likely to come from the Danube front, and shifted the centre of gravity of their forces towards the Upper Kolubara. The calvary division at Ub was ordered to reconnoitre towards Shabats and to separate the Shabats column of the enemy from the Drina columns. The II. Army was to push the right wing (Shumaja I.) against Shabats, and its centre and left along the Tser and Iverak ridges and the Yadar valley in conjunction with the III. Army, which concentrated forward from Valyevo to Zavlaka and Krupany to support its retiring outposts. The I. Army was to take over the whole northern front as far as Obrenovats. The Danube 1st Div. was transferred to it, the II. Army receiving Timok I. in exchange. 3 These movements, in spite of forced marching, took time, and but for the difficulties which at once arose in the Austrian army - the V. Army had only wheeled transport - so forward a concentration would have been impossible. As it was, the dispositions were practically realized by the night of Aug. 15-16, when the battle proper opened with the Austrians on the front Shabats - Slepcevish (elements of IV. Corps, and 29th Div., X. Corps, both of II. Army); Bela Reka - Tser plateau and Lyeshnitsa valley (VIII. Corps); Iverak ridge and Yadar valley W. of Yarebitse (36th Div., XIII. Corps); W. of Krupany and N.E. of Lyuboviya (remainder of XIII. Corps).
During the night and the day following there was heavy fighting on this line. The Serbian cavalry division, supported by Shumaja I. of the II. Army, pushed up to and towards the left of the positions of the Austrians about Shabats. The II. Army arrived in sufficient strength to hold a line on Tser, in the Lyeshnitsa valley, and on Iverak, in touch with the right of the III. Army W. of Yarebitse. But the centre and especially the left of that army retired under severe pressure from the Austrians (right of XIII. Corps) who, in this case equipped for mountain warfare, were able to capture Krupany and enforce the swingingback of the whole Serbian left wing. Yarebitse was given up and, pivoting on the right of the II. Army, the remainder of that army and the III. took up new positions in an arc about Zavlaka (night of 16-17th).
On the r7th the Serbian cavalry spread over the Machva, intercepting communications between the Austrian Shabats force and the columns working along Tser plateau.' But Shu t On Aug. 2-4, Serbian forces captured Uvats, Rudo and Ustivar, and raided the Drina immediately below Vishegrad. Other raids were pushed, with Montenegrin cooperation, over the Metalka Saddle on Chaynicha (ajnice), and towards Focha. On the 7th an Austrian advance from Vishegrad on Gradishte was checked by the Serbians. On the 16th a Serbian attempt to capture Vishegrad by forces from Uvats, Gradishte and the hills to the N.E. was repulsed. The Austrian XV. and XVI. Corps at the same time took the offensive on the front Vishegrad - Chaynicha. While the left flank was being cleared by sharp mountain fighting (19th) about Chelebish (S.E. of Focha), the Chaynicha force crossed the Metalka Saddle and moved on Plevlye, Priyepolye, while the Rudo troops on the left forced the Serbian positions on the Lim at Uvats and Priboy (20th-22nd) and the Vishegrad troops repulsed a second attack on their stronghold (loth-21st). But at this moment the collapse of the main offensive on the Drina compelled the Austrians to retreat to Vishegrad and Focha, whither they were followed by the Uzhitse army and the Montenegrin Plevlye group.
2 On Aug. 7-11 Montenegrin forces raided Artovatz on the Gatsko road and Klobuchi on the Trbinye road. Cattaro was intermittently bombarded, and Budua raided, from Mount Lovchen. These raids were repelled by the Austrian 3rd Mountain Brigade and 47th Division.. But on Aug. 15 the main body of the Montenegrins appeared before Bilek (Bileva) which they blockaded for some time. On the 25th-26th, however, a northward sortie of the garrison, coupled with a southward advance of the 3rd Mountain Brigade from Gatsko, caused the Montenegrins to give up the blockade, and on Aug. 30 - Sept. 2, forces from Trbinye cooperating, the 3rd Mountain Brigade and the Bilek force drove back the invaders into their own territory. A threat to the Montenegrin rear by part of the 3rd Mountain Brigade which advanced from Gatsko S.E. to Visznitsa Do largely contributed to the result.
' This distant division seems to have reached the front on the 18th. 4 The Austro-Hungarian force at Shabats was limited to pure self-defence by orders of the army command which was preparing maja I., advancing from the S. on Shabats, was arrested by entrenched infantry some 3 m. short of its objective. The II. Army on Tser and Iverak and the right of the III. Army in the Yadar valley maintained an unbroken front, and on Tser in particular carried out counter-attacks, but the continued pressure from the S.W. on the centre and left of the III. Army compelled a further retreat. Here the situation was becoming critical, the Austrian 42nd Div. threatening to seize the Valyevo road to Osechina behind the Serbian positions, while farther to the S.E. only third-ban troops stood between the Austrian mountain brigades and the Petska - Valyevo road.5 On the 18th the fighting continued in front of Shabats, and Shumaja I. drew back to Slatina, while the cavalry division, meeting the Austrian 21st Landwehr Div. about Lipolist, fell back to concentrate in line between Shumaja I. and the Tser ridge. On Tser and Iverak the day was a repetition of the 17th, with more pronounced counter-attacks on the front of the defence. On the right of the II. Army the strong position of Kozaningrad on Tser was stormed and held, in spite of the fact that reserves had been given up to strengthen the III. Army. On the critical wing of that army also the day was rather more favourable, - thanks to the arrival of the II. Army reserves alluded to above, which by counter-attacks prevented an imminent breach in the centre of the III. Army, now E. of Zavlaka, in the Yadar valley. Farther to the S.W., little ground was gained by the Austrian mountain troops, the Serbians still holding Rozan and Proslop at night.
The 19th was destined to be the critical day. On the Serbian right, the Austrian Shabats force, now superior in numbers to Shumaja I., took the offensive and drove back the Serbs to the river Dobrava, while the 21st Landwehr Div. from Lipolist pressed back the cavalry division a short distance. On the left of the general front, the III. Army and the left of the II. lost ground, both in the Yadar valley and on the extreme left where Rozan and Proslop and even Petska fell into the enemy's hands.
But in the centre, on Tser and Iverak, a definite change in the situation set in. Freed by the capture of Kozaningrad on the previous day, the Serbian " Combined " division on Tser pushed ahead rapidly along the ridge, although with every advance it was more and more ahead of the troops on either flank. This success not only imposed caution on the assailants of the cavalry division on the Machva plain, but, what was of decisive importance, brought them into positions overlooking the Lyeshnitsa valley. Threatened in rear, and with their wheeled transport exposed to capture, the Austrians began to fall back not only in that valley but also on Iverak before Morava I., and General Stepanovich decided to ignore the grave position of affairs on his left and force victory in the Yadar valley. The " Combined " division and Morava I., therefore, always echeloned from right to left, drove along Tser and Iverak, Timok I. in the Yadar valley conforming. The battle of the Yadar was decided.
On the 10th the drive along the ridges was accentuated more and more, and the Austrians fought no longer for victory, but for escape. So vigorous was the pursuit on Tser that a part of the " Combined " division outran all support and barely escaped destruction in the rear of the enemy's lines. Both along Tser and along Iverak, artillery was, with great efforts, pushed up behind the advancing infantry to shell the valleys below. In the Yadar valley Yarebitse was captured by 10 A.M. and the general pursuit ended near the Drina the same evening. The right wing of the Austrians, less hard pressed and better organized for movement in rough country, retired in good order. Morava II., from Valyevo, only reached Krupany on the 21st. No attempt was made, however, by the Austrians either on the Lower or the for the move to Galicia. After crossing on the 12th, it was actually withdrawn again on the 14th, leaving only outposts on the hostile bank. At Potiorek's request, however, the 29th Div. was again sent over the river on or about the 17th.
5 So serious was the situation that already on the 16th G.H.Q. had ordered Morava II. of the I. Army, hitherto posted about Lazarevats to meet a possible attack by Obrenovats, to move by forced marches to a position astride the Petska - Valyevo road. The division reached this position on the 18th.
Middle Drina to keep a foothold on the right hand, and on the 22nd the whole river front was again occupied by the Serbians.
Meanwhile the troops of the Austrian II. Army had ceased to press Shumaja I. on the line of the Dobrava, and begun to fall back on Shabats, and the 21st Landwehr Div. in the plain likewise retreated on the Drina, followed by the Serbian cavalry division which gleaned prisoners, guns and vehicles. On Aug. 21-22, Shumaja I., reinforced by troops from Tser on its left, and also by Timok II. from the I. Army, advanced from the S.E., S., and S.W. on Shabats, held by elements of the IV. Corps and by the 29th Div., under the command of General Tersztyanski. On the 23rd sharp counter-strokes were made by the Austrians to hold off pressure on their river flank. Only rear-guards remained in Shabats when the Serbs attacked on the 24th.
So ended the first invasion of Serbia. The principal reason for its failure was the Austrian commander-in-chief's undervaluation of the military, and overvaluation of the political, factors with which he had to deal. Neither on the part of the Higher Command nor on the part of the Court was pressure brought to bear on him. Nor, after the event, did he attempt to find scapegoats among his subordinates. What he did, he did in the exercise of unfettered judgment. But history will not regard this judgment as of a high order. To hurry 1 on an offensive in mountainous country, from a starting-point at a maximum distance from the strategically decisive point, with three armies equipped in the main for warfare in the plains, of which one was under orders for another theatre, is so astonishing a proceeding that it can only be assumed that the campaign was never intended to be more than a demonstration of activity, analogous to a punitive march up some valley of the Indian frontier region. And indeed, Potiorek's position as civil and military commander of a rough frontier region has been very aptly compared to that of an Indian viceroy. Regarded from this standpoint, the advance over the Drina is an operation differing in degree only from the advance of the XV. and XVI. Corps on the Lim or that of the 3rd Mountain Brigade into the fastnesses S.E. of Gatsko. And in such an operation the assistance of the II. Army might no doubt be dispensed with. But if the ground of justification be thus shifted, the basis of criticism is shifted also, and in that case what is to be said of a modern European commander-in-chief who thought that an organized army of II strong divisions, recently victorious in two campaigns over other organized armies, could be treated as though it were on the military-technical level of a frontier tribe? Actually, it appears that the astonishment and dismay of the commanders, from army down to and below division commanders, at the incomprehensible sequence of events was no small factor in the issue.
Of the conduct of operations on the Serbian side it need only be said that Putnik's management of his forces in space and time, and the choice of the moment and place of counter-attack, were masterly. To gain great results, the risks of a forward concentration were accepted, but always under such conditions that the chances and profits of success were greater than the chances and losses of defeat. The object was limited, but its attainment complete without remainder.
At the same time, in this as in many other instances, the idea of a limitation of objective has been criticised per se. Only a detailed reconstruction of the conditions at the moment of the counter-offensive would make a final judgment to be formed on the question in the present case; and for that the materials not only have not been published but are probably not even in existence, since the bulk of the Serbian archives were destroyed in the autumn of 1915. But this much may be said, that the Serbians were, in point of ammunition and transport, ill-equipped for a great strategic pursuit either into Bosnia or into Hungary, that the great battle in Galicia was only just opening, and its consequences could scarcely be foreseen, and that the strain of the forced marches imposed by the forward concentration, followed by that of hill fighting, had told heavily on the victors.
The Syrmian Operation and the Massed Austro-Hungarian 1 The Commander of the V. Army, von Frank, protested against this hurry, and only submitted to a formal order.
Attack
The Yadar and Shabats operations closed, then, on the river line, but meanwhile no events had taken place on the front E. of Obrenovats, and the Austro-Hungarians were palpably withdrawing forces by all railheads between Weisskirchen and Mitrovitsa, and after a short rest the Serbian command decided to push an offensive over the Sava into Syrmia (Srem), the subdistrict of Hungary lying in the angle between the Sava and Danube. In this region were three of the six railheads at the enemy's disposal and an important lateral line. Its occupation would therefore thrust back the line of deployment of any future attack from the N., and the new front to be held defensively at the further limit of the occupied area would lie in and across the Fruska mountain range (the Mitrovitsa - Peterwardein), and thence along a part of the Danube which was exceptionally strong as an obstacle - owing to the marshes and channels at the confluence of the Theiss - to Semlin and the old Danube front. This gained, it would be possible to embark upon an invasion of Bosnia without fear of a sudden attack in flank and rear.
As early as the 26th, two days after the reconquest of Shabats, Putnik issued general instructions regrouping the army for the new project. The II. Army (now to consist of Morava I., Timok I., Timok II., and " Combined " divisions) was to occupy and defend the Lower Drina to Lyeshnitsa exclusive. The III. Army (Drina I., Drina II., Morava II.) was to hold from Lyeshnitsa inclusive to Zvornik. A special detachment, reporting directly to G.H.Q., was to hold the crossings below and at Lyuboviya. The I. Army (Shumaja I., Danube I., cavalry division) was to assemble towards Shabats and prepare to force a passage into Syrmia. The Belgrade and Pozharevats groups were to continue in their defensive missions, the former to be prepared to cooperate with the I. Army in the capture of Semlin, the latter to dispatch its principal formation, Danube II., to Obrenovats for Sept. 9. The Uzhitse Army was to continue its mountain offensive towards Vishegrad, in concert with the Montenegrin Plevlye group. The date of the Sava crossing was to be ordered by G.H.Q., and meanwhile the II. and IV. Armies were instructed to reconnoitre crossing places on the Drina line, and to obtain all possible intelligence as to the condition of the enemy in their front.
A pause followed, while the preliminary work was being carried out and the I. Army being marched over from the Morava valley. The enemy was occupied with reorganization, and with the reliefs and takings-over consequent on the withdrawal of the II. Army.. On the whole northern front there remained one post-line division only, the 29th; along the rivers themselves were Landsturm formations. Yet Potiorek was in fact contemplating a new thrust on the Drina; and the 29th Div. was ordered to be ready to cooperate by forcing a passage of the Sava at Yarak. Thus it befell that the division was grouped between Huma, Yarak and Nikinci when the Serbian offensive was launched. Apart from it, there were no formations in Syrmia other than the regiments holding the thin surveillance line.
On Sept. 3 General Krauss, commanding the 29th A.H. Div., received word that the Serbs intended to force the passage of the Sava below Mitrovitsa. This report he more than half-disbelieved, and in any case, regarding Mitrovitsa - Yarak as the centre of gravity of the Serbian offensive into Syrmia, he was content to leave his forces grouped as they were for Potiorek's intended advance. This was to take place on the 7th, and for it the 7th Inf. Div. was added to Krauss's command, henceforward known as the " Combined Corps Krauss." On the night of Sept. 5-6, the Serbian preparations being complete, the passage was forced in two places, between Mitrovitsa and Yarak by Timok I. of the II. Army, and at the Kupinovo loop by the I. Army. The former, intended more as a demonstration than an operative crossing, was successfully achieved, but the eager troops pressed on without making a bridgehead, fell into the midst of Krauss's troops and, driven back on the river, were overwhelmed in the attempt to recross, five battalions being completely destroyed.
The Kupinovo division, on the other hand, secured their position with a bridgehead line before pushing on. Fortune favoured them, too, for the defence here consisted of Landsturm forces directed by a headquarters at Peterwardein, and Krauss, bound to Yarak by his orders to cooperate in Potiorek's Drina offensive which had not been cancelled, only sent his newly arriving 7th Div., piecemeal, to assist the Landsturm in holding the Syrmian plain. This was, of course, unknown to the Serbian I. Army, which developed its advance cautiously across the plain and by the night of the 8th occupied a front from Platicheno near Klenak by Brestac round to Progar. In the next days, the left stood almost fast while the right pushed out, cleared a passage for the troops at Obrenovats, and by a threat to the rear of Semlin forced the enemy to give up that place to the Belgrade forces. Lastly, the right of the line swung up with its flank on the Danube and its centre on Gorubintsi; the intention was to bring this right wing by a wheel into the W. part of the Fruska range and so to make good the line across that range from river to river which was the objective, without losing men in a frontal battle against the enemy's strong forces about Huma and Mitrovitsa. For three more days it was persisted in, then on the evening of Sept. 11, owing to the situation of affairs on the Drina front, it was given up. On the 12th, 13th and 14th a methodical retreat, with which Krauss's 29th Div., though released at last from Mitrovitsa - Yarak, was unable to interfere seriously, brought the Serbian I. Army and Belgrade and Obrenovats forces back to their original positions whence the field divisions were hurried with all speed to take part in the new battle of the Drina.
Potiorek's second offensive had opened on the night of Sept. 7-8. The VIII. Corps (with which originally the 29th Div. was to have cooperated) bordered the Lower Drina as far up as Biyelyina, the XIII. from that point to Kozluk, the XV. thence to Zvornik, and finally the major part of the XVI. corps opposite Lyuboviya, the remainder, as in the previous phase, facing the Uzhitse Army and the Montenegrins. The Serbs were, as the result of the Yadar operations and the proposed offensive into Bosnia, deployed in strength, and this, on the one hand, increased the probability of repulsing any given attempt, but on the other made it more difficult to deal with any break-through that might actually occur, as the defence system lacked depth.
The attack began with the VIII. Corps. Here it only succeeded in establishing a bridgehead in the N.W. corner of the Machva, covering temporary bridges at Parashnitsa; and the expected cooperative attempt of the 29th Div. at Yarak was not made, as, by the date fixed for this cooperation (the 9th), Krauss had concluded that the failure of the VIII. Corps was too clear, and the situation in Syrmia too critical to allow it.
But farther S., on the front of the XV. Austrian Corps and the right of the XIII., the Serbians' III. Army had more difficult conditions for defence, and on the night of Sept. 8-9 the passage was forced first at Brasinski Han and then at Zvornik. Crossings followed at other points farther up as far as Lyuboviya. The Serbs were forced back to the Guchevo - Boranya - Yagodnya ridge.
By the 11th the situation on this wing was serious enough for the Serbian command to order the cessation of the Syrmian offensive and the transfer of the I. Army with all possible speed to the region of Valyevo - Petska.
Meanwhile, local reserves gathered from behind the centre had been dispatched to establish a front Yagodnya - Brankovac - Rozani - Proslop. Behind this line, the reassembly of the I. Army about Valyevo was to take place. Its headquarters were ordered to Valyevo, its forces to the same point as a preliminary to concentrating about Petska, whence the enemy was to be attacked in flank and rear towards Krupany, Zavlaka or Osechitsa, according to the amplitude of his presumed sweep. The definite line of resistance on which battle was to be accepted if the Austrian pressure was maintained, was from the Dobrava S. of Shabats to Brestovats and Tser ridge (II. Army), thence in the hills about Zavlaka or about Osechitsa (III. Army), according to circumstances, to whatever point on the Petska - Valyevo road the concentrating I. Army 1 was able to reach in time.
1 To aid in this concentration, only the Danube I. Div. was to be disengaged at once in Syrmia, and the army was to be reconstituted by this division's picking up en route Danube II. from Obrenovats and a division of the II. Army from Tekerish. This latter did not join, becoming absorbed in the lower Yadar fighting.
Two days later the situation was suddenly modified again. On the night of 12-13th parts of the Austro-Hungarian XIII. Corps began to cross the Drina at Kuriachista, midway between Lyeshnitsa and Loznitsa, opposite the left of the II. Serbian Army, which was by now weakened through giving up local reserves and taking over an extended front for the benefit of the III. Army. This new move threatened not only to cut the Serbian line in two, but to roll up the whole Guchevo - Yagodnya position by a drive along the Yadar valley behind it.
With this, the battle becomes too tangled for brief description. Though the particular threat from Kuriachista was soon ended, the left of the Austro-Hungarian XV. Corps developed strong attacks on Loznitsa. The struggle for the W. end of Guchevo ridge and the lower part of the Yadar valley was fed from day to day by successive reinforcements arriving on each side. Here, minor contests for the possession of minor ground features, attempts to hold a hill long enough for it to be crossed with guns, or to storm it before it could be crowned, went on for days collaterally with the pressure exercised by the Austrian mountain troops of the XVI. Corps on the left of the Serbian III. Army, until the forces of the Serbian I. Army began to appear on Sept. 15. Next day, with a considerable force in hand, the I. Army staff mounted a counter-attack which bore back the Austrians from the line W. of Kostaynik - Sanats (pt. 835) - Sokoloka PlaninaPetska, to one which on the evening of the 18th ran from W. of Kostaynik - Sanats - Veles - Karashitsa - Lyuboviya. Then, with further Serbian gains to the right of Sanats, fighting died away all along the line and trench warfare set in on the front from Karashista to Lyuboviya, the Austrians and Serbs facing one another on the line Guchevo - Boranya - Yagodnya - spur S. of Yagodnya.
On the Machva front, meanwhile, the offensive of the VIII. Corps, which had at first obtained only a bridgehead at Parashnitsa, was resumed in combination with a crossing at Yarak by Krauss's corps, when Syrmia had been evacuated by the Serbs. Here also, after violent but narrow-fronted attacks, trench warfare set in on the line of the two bridgeheads (N. of ShabatsGlushtsi, and Ravnye - Serbian Racha) which on Oct. 31 were united in one by a successful advance of the VIII. Corps from Ravnye to Glushtsi.
The second phase had been very different from the first. The Austrian staff had taken their opponent seriously, and laid their plans carefully, and it was only after the greatest exertions and very heavy losses that the Serbs had succeeded in pushing back the invaders. Even so, the latter had mastered the greatest part of the river obstacles, and in the absence of aircraft on the side of the defence, could carry on all preparations for a fresh offensive. unseen behind their firmly held trench-line.
Meanwhile, the Uzhitse Army and the Montenegrins, who at the close of the first phase were following up the retreating Austrians towards Vishegrad, had developed a series of operations which, like the expedition into Syrmia, were designed to prepare the way for a serious offensive of the II. and III. Armies over the Drina. This being forestalled by the Austrian offensive, the operations of the Uzhitse Army and its allies were without practical effect. They were, however, vigorously conducted.2 2 On Sept. 4 Goles Height, S.E. of Vishegrad, was stormed by Shumaja II., while farther up the Dwina, other Serbian and Montenegrin forces attacked at Ustipratsa, Gorazda and Focha. At the latter place the Montenegrins broke through on Sept. i 1, and a raid was pushed deep into the enemy's country, while a number of simultaneous attacks at Gorazda, Ustipratsa, Vishegrad and Bainabashta caused the Austrian 8th Mountain Brigade to draw back to Han Pesak and Srebenitsa, when it crossed the rear of its Corps (XVI.) fighting N. of Lyuboviya. This and the other Austrian mountain brigades, however, maintained an active war of raids and expeditions in the mountains. The Montenegrin main body, from Focha, moved E. to Kalinovik, which it captured and then evacuated. Other Montenegrins from Focha and Serbs from the Vishegrad and Rogatitsa region threatened Sarajevo for some time, though periodically cleared away by expeditions of the mountain brigade from Sarajevo and the 8th Mountain Brigade from Srebenitsa and Han Pesak. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Serbian Uzhitse forces (Shumaja II.) advanced by Han Pesak on Vlasenitsa, and also to Srebenitsa. Indecisive fighting took place at the former during the last of September and the first of October, but at Srebenitsa the threat to the rear of the Austrian XVI. Corps was dissi The Kolubara Campaign. - The course of the war during September and October had not been favourable to Austria-Hungary. Galicia had been lost, and the line of battle had receded W. until it lay in the region of Lodz-Cracow-the Dunajec and the Carpathians. In November, the campaign in the western theatres had ended in deadlock. Falkenhayn had succeeded to the control of German operations, and his doctrine of wearing-down strategy was taking shape. Winter was at hand.
Nevertheless, Potiorek meant to resume active operations. No binding order prevented him from doing so. Conrad's instructions were that he was to prevent an irruption of the Serbs into Austro-Hungarian territory, but it was left to him to decide whether that defence should be passive or conducted offensively by partial attacks. The Emperor expressed the wish that Potiorek would succeed in defending the monarchy, to which the Feldzeugmeister replied that he " hoped to do a good deal better than that." Falkenhayn, with his wider outlook, suggested a sudden seizure of the N.E. corner of Serbia with the view of opening up a line of munitions transport to Turkey, but this project aroused no interest at the headquarters of the " viceroy " of Bosnia, who was resolved to drive another offensive into Serbia with all his might, at the first favourable opportunity.
The Serbians meanwhile had suffered severely from the unfamiliar conditions of trench warfare, notably in the Machva, and at the end of October Putnik had decided to evacuate the line in that quarter. The Austrian attack of Oct. 31, therefore, met with only outpost resistance, and Shabats was occupied two days later, while monitor activity continued on the rivers.' The advance of Krauss and the VIII. Corps in the Machva was the first stage of the new general offensive. On the night of the 4-5 th it was developed by a frontal attack from Shabats combined with a fresh crossing at Mishar, the Serbians continuing their retreat to the line N. Dobrava-Dobrits-Tser ridge. On the next night (Nov. 5-6) a heavy bombardment opened along the whole Austrian front, especially on that of the Guchevo range. On the 6th, infantry pressure began along the mountains from the W. end of Guchevo as far as Yagodnya. Once more, evidently, Potiorek intended the centre of gravity of his attack to be on the right and right centre, the front of his own army composed of mountain troops long familiar to him, and well equipped for the work. On the 6th, from the slopes of Guchevo itself he issued a proclamation, stirring his troops to the highest efforts by promising them this time the " annihilation " of the " exhausted " enemy. Nor were these empty words, for the condition of the Serbian moral at this time and their shortage of ammunition were evident.
At this opening moment, the dispositions and order of battle on both sides were as follows: Serbian II. Army (Vidoyevitsa-Dobrava): Morava I., Timok II., Shumaja I., Timok II., Ca y. div. and details; 63 battalions, 27 squadrons, 34 batteries.
III. Army (Yadar-Kostaynik): Drina I., Drina II., Combined Division; 40 battalions, 6 squadrons, 18 batteries.
I. Army, under Boyovish (Kostaynik-Uzovnitsa stream and Drina): Morava III., Danube I., Danube II. (temporarily de pated by a counter-attack of the 8th Mountain Brigade when that formation returned from an expedition in relief of Sarajevo. The Serbian column retreated whence it had come, to Bainabashta. Finally, when on the main front much warfare set in, the Serbians and Montenegrins began slowly to retire to their respective frontiers, while on the other side a systematic drive was carried out by large forces of the XV. and XVI. Corps. One Austrian group advanced from Sarajevo E. on Rogatitsa, and won a severe engagement on Romanja Planina on Oct. 21-22. While another following up the retirement of the Serbs from Vlasenitsa advanced on Rogatitsa from the N. The Montenegrins between Focha and Katinovik did not give way without inflicting severe losses on the group opposed to them. But by the end of October all the allied forces had withdrawn behind the Drina. Farther S., the region of Artovats was again the scene of some irregular fighting in October.
' During October, there had been many local engagements on the Danube-Sava front. Belgrade was frequently bombarded. The defence was very active, and minefields were placed at several points, to one of which, near Shabats, the monitor " Temes " fell victim on Oct. 23. In the main, however, the Austrians kept the upper hand.
tached to II. Army); Lyuboviya detachment; 44 battalions, 9 squadrons, 242 batteries.
Uzhitse Army, under Aratich (along Upper Drina from Tiryeshnitsa stream to the Lim, front continued thence by Montenegrins): Shumaja II., Lim detachments, Uzhitse Brigade; 34 battalions, 2 squadrons, 12 batteries.
Belgrade Detachment, under Zhivkovich (Brestovik-Pechani); 17 battalions, one squadron, 9 field and some medium batteries. Obrenovats Detachment (Pechani-Vukodrazh R.): 6 battalions, 3 batteries.
Branicevo Group and Kraina Group (Brestovik-Kladovo): 12 battalions, 4 batteries.
(The three last-mentioned forces were on the river front.) Serbian total: 226 battalions of all categories, 41 squadrons, 113 batteries, modern and B.L.
The Austro-Hungarian forces and dispositions, as established by the Serbians, were as follows: River front from Shabats E.: 55 battalions, almost entirely Landsturm.
Shabats-Machva-Loznitsa front (V. Army, in order from left to right Krauss, VIII., XIII.): 87 battalions.
Loznitsa-Lyuboviya (VI. Army, XV., XVI. Corps, 40 Honved Divs., and other troops): 1 to battalions.
South-west of Lyuboviya: mountain troops (1-2 brigades).
On the 7th, the VI. Army attacked and pushed the Serbian III. Army off the entire Guchevo ridge, and bore back the I. Army 2 and the right of the Uzhitse Army till the latter, marking the extreme left of the battlefronts, stood on Trsvena Stena.
On the 8th the retrograde movement of the III. and I. Armies continued to the line Kozaningrad (pt. 706) on Tser-Strasha (1424)-Zavlaka-Petrina Stena-Proslop. Meanwhile, the Serbs on the Machva retiring to the line Kozaningrad-the Dobrava were under strong pressure. Next day, in the midst of general activity on the water, an Austrian regiment forced the passage of the Danube at Semendria, threatening an inroad in the Morava valley itself, and part of the Belgrade force was hurried E. to deal with this threat, which it did successfully.
The reports from the front had already decided Putnik to withdraw to a line covering Valyevo, viz. Obrenovats group, Kolubara mouth to Skela; II. Army, Ub-Blizonzhski heights; III. Army, Yantina-Kamenitsa; I. Army, Yolina Breza-Sovachki Kik; Uzhitse Army, right Trsvena Stena-centre and left Vishegrad to river Lim. But it soon became apparent that a stand could not be made on this line. Moral was low, with mixture of units considerable. In the two Drina divisions of the II. Army in particular men feared for their families and considerable numbers left the ranks and made their way home, while accompanying the retreat were hundreds of refugee families with their carts and beasts, fugitive or requisitioned. From the interior, new drafts came up in thousands and congested Valyevo.
Though the army was by no means in dissolution, it was undisguisedly in full retreat. By order of G.H.Q. communications were destroyed in the retirement.
The line now to be taken up was the so-called " Kolubara line," which from the rear followed that river to the confluence of the tributary Lig, then, by the Lig to Gukosi and thence by height 700 to the Malyen ridge at Malyen (point 997). The Kolubara part of the line (with a defensive flank along the Sava) was to be held by the Obrenovats group; from just below Lazarevats to Malyen inclusive was allotted to the II., III. and I. Armies west. The Uzhitse Army was to leave one brigade at Kadinyacha on the ridge between Rogatitsa and Uzhitse, the remainder astride the Vishegrad-Uzhitse road at Shargan.
By the evening of Nov. 14, the Obrenovats detachment had taken up its positions behind the Kolubara, the II. Army had fallen back from Kotsielevo towards Lazarevats and the Middle Kolubara, the III. Army, always manoeuvring so as to extricate its right before its left could be turned, was astride the YadarValyevo road at the water parting about Kamenitsa, and the I. Army continued the line S. to Velovitsa, with its Rogatitsa detachment (somewhat out of touch) pushing the left in the 2 The I. Army was short of Danube II., which had been taken to strengthen the II. Army N. of Tser. Habitual disregard of the order of battle, i.e. an unnecessary regrouping, has been criticised as a peculiar failing in the Serbian method of conducting operations. Often, of course, there was no alternative. But there seems sonic justification for the criticism, nevertheless.
higher mountains. By the evening of the r6th, the positions were: - Obrenovats group, Obrenovats-Konatitsa; Cavalry division, Konatitsa-S.W. of Stepoyevats; II. Army, Voluyak-Lazarevats-Chavka; III. Army, Chibutkovitsa-Ivanovatsa; I. Army, Gukoshi-Mednik-Bachinovats-Ruda-Malyen; Uzhitse Army, right S.E. of Yasenovats-Yelova Gai, and left Shargan and Leshka Gora.
The weather was terrible, but Potiorek, sure of success, drove on his troops to new efforts, although communications became worse and longer day by day. On the r7th the cavalry at Konatitsa was threatened, and had to be reinforced, while the mountain troops of the XVI. Corps, pushing along the ridge of Malyen, reached Strazara (pt. r000). On the r8th the position of Choka on the front of the II. Army was attacked. But the main bodies of the invaders' columns were not yet up to the front. The Serbs thus enjoyed a relative respite, and their left, at Malyen, was able to reestablish patrol communication with the Uzhitse Army.
On the r9th the Austro-Hungarian main bodies began to exercise general pressure, their efforts being specially directed on the angle of the Kolubara and the Lig, and on the point where the line crossed the Yadar river (Gukoshi and Mednik heights). On the 10th the battle followed the same course, and Putnik ordered an offensive to be resumed on both flanks. But the time was not ripe, and the army and divisional generals reported themselves unable to carry it out.
On the 2r st the Austrian XVI. Corps broke the GukoshiMalyen line in its centre and the defence was brought back to Gukoshi-552-Rayats-Suvobor-Malyen, and on the 23rd the Malyen position was evacuated and touch with the Uzhitse Army again lost. Nothing now intervened between the XVI. Corps and the head of the western Morava valley, but the weather and the distance of its supply sources, and the liability of the convoys to be cut off by descents of the Uzhitse Army, imposed caution, and for some days only minor fighting occurred here.
In reality, it was not here that Potiorek intended to win his victory, but farther north. The initial phase of the operations was complete when Valyevo was in his hands, and secured against attack from the S. by a sufficient foreground. The next was to be the driving back of the Serbs from the Lower Kolubara, the cutting off of Belgrade, the opening of the Obrenovats-Valyevo railway for supply, and finally the advance in the dry and not too hilly country N. of Lazarevats into the Morava valley, accompanied in its last stages by a descent upon Chachak and Gorni Milanovats in the enemy's rear.
The weather had, however, converted the poor roads of the Ub country into deep mud, and the regulation military transport foundered in this mud, so that the intended rapid advance by Krauss and the VIII. Corps to the Kolubara had been impossible. The mountain troops had outpaced the scheme, and it was not till the 22nd that the Austrian V. Army was able to open a real attack on the Kolubara. By the 25th it had made good the passage, but progress was slow, and at that date only Chopka and Konatitsa had fallen. Obrenovats still held.
Putnik had now resolved to give up Belgrade. Ammunition was expected, but had not arrived. Moral was becoming lower and lower, and only ruthless concentration on essentials would enable the army to last till the day when, with pouches and wagons refilled, counter-offensives could be launched. Meanwhile, his policy was to fight for time, so as to evacuate Belgrade as thoroughly as possible. 1 Then the Belgrade and Obrenovats forces were combined and posted on the line Varovnitsa-KosmaiSibnitsa (night of 29-30th), in touch on the right with the Pozharevats (or Branicevo) force, which held the Danube front astride the Morava. The Austrians entered Belgrade on Dec. r.
On Dec. 2 the Serbian positions were as follows:- Belgrade-Obrenovats force, Varovnitsa-520-313-Rogacko Brdo-281.
H. Army (4 divisions and cavalry division), Sibnitsa-OlbrezakRavani (318)-Medvyednik (365)-Vayan (490).
1 Some French naval guns had to be blown up, as they could not be removed. Before destruction they fired all their ammunition into Bezania.
III. Army (3 divisions), Mramor (398)-Kalanyevitse-489-520Motika (603).
I. Army (4 divisions), (now commanded by Mishich), NakuchaniVrnchani-Sinoshevtsi-Galich (703)-Vuskova Glavitsa.
Uzhitse Army (equivalent of 2 divisions) Kita-Kablar-OvcharMarkovitsa.
On the Austro-Hungarian side they were:- V. Army: Combined Corps and VIII. Corps, area E. of Lower Kolubara and S. of Belgrade; XIII. Corps, Arapovats-Trbushnitsa-Parlog-Liplye.
VI. Army: XV. Corps, Vrlaya-Golubats; XVI. Corps, Vranovitsa-Leusitsi-Ruyevitsa (583), detachments Godun, Pozhega, Arilye.
Both opponents were by now almost worn out. Suffering from their exertions, their losses, and the absence of food, shelter and ammunition, they were held together only by the inertia of the system. In this condition victory would fall to that side which first found a stimulus. This came to the defenders in two forms, the example of the old King, who took a rifle and fought in the ranks, and the arrival of the long-expected ammunition.
On the night of the 2nd, while Potiorek was slowly regrouping his forces to develop the attack on his left, Putnik issued orders for a general offensive S. of Sibnitsa "in order to profit by the enemy's present weakness and raise the moral of our troops." The II. Army was to drive the enemy over the Kolubara; the III. (Drina II. and " Combined " division) to push towards the old line on the Lig; the I. to make good the line Krivareka-Lozany-Teochin (in order from right to left, Timok II., Morava II., Danube I., Danube II.); of the Uzhitse Army the available portion of Shumaja II. to attack N. and N.W. along Pranyani and Goina Gora; the Lim detachment to attack between the Lushnitsa and Venchaska streams by Breziak N.; the remainder of this undispersed army standing fast or forming a defensive flank for the advancing centre.
The counter-offensive was delivered or launched on the morning of Dec. 3, and was quite unexpected by the Austrians. The Uzhitse Army's offensive wing reached a line astride its assigned ridges marked by Ruyevitsa and Godun. The I. Army drove the XVI. Corps back to the line Byezna-Ozrem-Kriva Reka. The III. Army reached the line Vrlaya-Lipet, the I. Okressak-Barosevats-295-347, while on its right the cavalry maintained contact, at Slatina, with the defensive right flank, the Belgrade-Obrenovats force.
Next day the Uzhitse Army's advance was sharply arrested, and it only maintained its ground on the line 370-RuyevitsaGodun-Oruyewitsa-Krstats. But the I. Army drove a deep wedge, and by nightfall occupied Golubats-Prostruga-RayetsSuvobor-Babina Glava. The III. and II. Armies met with stiff resistance. The III. made no progress, and the southern wing of the II. was hung up by the unshaken resistance of Kremenitsa; the N. wing reached Arapovats and Sakulya. No serious fighting occurred on the part of the cavalry or on that of the BelgradeObrenovats force, and the commander of the latter, fearing that an envelopment was in progress, extended his right to the heights E. of Grotska. Next day Putnik, conscious also of the danger of allowing the regrouped Austrians to break through into the Morava region and envelop his right, caused the II. Army to extend its right (Timok II.) past Vitnitsa to Kosmay heights, behind the cavalry. The attack of the centre was in fact at a standstill, and it was evident that it was impossible to defeat the enemy's leftward regrouping of flank attack.
On this day (Dec. 5) the Uzhitse Army's attack, numerically weak and divided amongst several directions, came to a standstill. But the success of the I. Army on the ridge of Prostruga was made definitive, the Austrian XVI. Corps brigades retiring N. towards the Kolubara with heavy losses.
On the 6th the I. Army pursued its opponents N. and downhill towards Valyevo, while on the left of its flank the Uzhitse Army made advances N., N.W. and W. against weakening opposition, and on the right the III. Army reached the line of the Lig. But simultaneously, the storm broke on the extreme right, where the slowly prepared attack of Krauss and the VIII. Corps was launched at last. The line of defence held, but Timok I. from the II. Army was set in motion for the extreme right.
On the 7th, while the I. and Uzhitse Armies continued their advance to Valyevo and Uzhitse respectively - their opponents withdrawing divergently on the Loznitsa and Shabats routes - the III. turned the flank of the defenders of Kremenika and thus enabled the II. Army, weak as it now was, to make progress towards Lazarevats and Voluyak height. But on the right the Austrian attack made real progress and approached the advanced line of the Kosmay position. On the Sth and again on the 9th the Kosmay line itself was taken and retaken. On the evening of the 9th the alignment of the Serbian defensive flank was from the Danube E. of Grotska, by Umchari, Varovnitsa, and Kosmay to the Kolubara valley near Sakallia. Lazarevats was reoccupied by troops of the II. Army on the 9th, and the III. Army, coming up into line with the I., bordered the Kolubara as far as Valyevo, these two armies beginning the pursuit of those Austrian forces which had taken the Shabats direction
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Serbian Campaigns'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/s/serbian-campaigns.html. 1910.
